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Waiting for the Labor Law of the 
Twenty-First Century: 
Everything Old Is New Again 
William R. Corbettt 
At the end of the twentieth century, the body of the law of employment in the 
United States has evolved to a scarcely rational patchwork. It is 
comprehensible as a whole, if at all, only when viewed through the lens of 
its history.1 
-Patrick Harden 
If employees begin knowing that they have the right to organize, that they 
have the right to develop a sense of organization, and that they can 
experience organization through trial and error-such as by standing by 
each other in disciplinary interviews, or discussing with one another 
common problems of the workplace and not being afraid to bring them to 
the attention of management-they will indeed have begun to exercise their 
right of association in the workplace. This was Senator Wagner's grand 
vision.2 
-Charles J. Morris 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Vulnerable Workers, Nervous Employers, and Irrelevant Unions 
It is the dawn of the twenty-first century. In the United States, the 
world's most productive economy, workers are vulnerable to the largely 
unbridled discretion of their employers regarding employment decisions. In 
comparison with many other industrialized nations, the United States does 
not provide much legal protection for employees. With few exceptions, 
employers can terminate employees at will for any reason. 3 This ultimate 
power over employees in the workplace means that employers can do 
almost whatever they want to employees working for them; they can 
monitor employees' computers, they can harass and bully them or permit 
such conduct by co-workers, they can pay them low wages,4 and they can 
give them few benefits. If mistreated workers find conditions unbearable, 
they can quit or be fired. They may sue, but the prospects of a successful 
lawsuit are low.5 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, employers in the United 
States claim to feel besieged by legal regulations and potential liability.6 A 
patchwork of federal and state statutes and common law provide some 
protections to employees by prohibiting some employment actions and 
requiring others. Some laws mandate that employers provide minimum 
terms and conditions of employment. Notwithstanding the daunting power 
the employment-at-will doctrine supposedly bestows on employers, many 
insist that it is a myth, a "rule" riddled with so many exceptions that it 
cannot be relied upon. 7 These exceptions to the at-will doctrine mean that 
3.  A popular statement of the employment-at-will doctrine is that employers can fire employees 
"for a good reason, a bad reason, or for no reason at all. " See, e.g., REBECCA HANNER WHITE, 
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS 8 (1998); 
see also Payne v. Western & At!. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 520 ( 1884) ("All may dismiss their employe[e]s at 
will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being 
thereby guilty of legal wrong. "), overruled on other grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S. W. 134 (Tenn. 
1915). That rendition of the doctrine demonstrates the absolute power the doctrine gives employers, but 
does anyone ever do anything for no reason at all? 
4. As long as the wages are not below the federal minimum wage established in the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, or some higher state or municipal minimum wage, 29 U.S. C. §§ 206, 2 18 (2000). 
5. Workers do have protections provided by federal legislation and state legislation and case law, 
which have created exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. Still, employment-at-will is the 
default rule, and it has provided significant protection to employers in terminations and other adverse 
actions taken against employees. 
6. See generally WALTER OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: HOW EMPLOYMENT LAW IS 
PARALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE ( 1997). 
7. See, e.g., Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 
AM. Bus. L.J. 653, 687 (2000) ("[T]he lessons of the current trends in the wrongful discharge area . . .  
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employers must be careful about whom they fire, why they fire, and how 
they fire. To prepare for possible litigation, employers must document 
everything negative about employees' performance and conduct. They may 
be sued, and though the employee's chance of success is low, the 
employer's liability may be quite large. 
And labor unions? At this time they are not a major player in most 
workplaces in the United States and represent only about thirteen and a half 
percent of the workforce and about nine percent of the private sector 
workforce. 8 
While this situation may cause alarm for some, others believe that the 
relative lack of legal protection of employees in the United States is a factor 
in producing the nation's recent economic growth.9 The United States has 
the largest economy in the world with the lowest unemployment rate in the 
industrialized world. It advises Japan, the second largest economy in the 
world, on how to refashion its labor laws to reinvigorate that nation's 
economy .10 The European Union member nations, while disdaining the 
relative lack of legal protection that laws in the United States afford 
employees, envy the economic growth, job creation, and low 
unemployment rate that the United States enjoys.11 
suggest that employers soon will no longer be able to terminate employees for no cause or bad cause. 
The future of employment-at-will, then, is that it has no future."). 
8. Union Members Decline to 16.3 Million as Share of Employed Slips to 13.5 Percent, Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 13 (Jan. 19, 2001). 
9. It can be argued persuasively that it is a non sequitur that the recent economic prosperity and 
low unemployment in the United States is a product of the labor laws; indeed, the United States had 
basically the same labor and employment law when the unemployment rate was high and the economy 
was much less productive, and Japan and its lifetime employment model was looked upon as the 
paragon. See, e.g., Sonni Efron, A Wobbly Japan Puts on Training Wheels With Lifetime Job 
Guarantees in Ruins, Anxious Workers Flock to Western-Style Re-Education Centers, Los ANGELES 
TIMES, June 10, 1999, at A1 ("Just 10 years ago, Japan's vaunted lifetime employment system was the 
envy of the West."); John Duckers, Business View: Respect for the Workers Remains Priority for 
Japanese, BIRMINGHAM POST, June 5, 1999, at 19 ("The Japanese economy is struggling badly when 
not so long ago it was the envy of the world."); Marcus Gee, The Japanese Disease, THE GLOBE AND 
MAlL, October 30, 1996 ("Japan is a mess, and it may be for quite a few years yet. How did it get that 
way? How did this economic colossus, envy of the world, suddenly find itself in so much trouble?"). I 
thank Professor Summers for emphasizing the incongruity of the view that the United States' labor laws 
are responsible for the nation's low unemployment rate. 
10. See Kiroku Hanai, Hold Of  on U.S-Style Layoffs, THE JAPAN TIMES, May 3, 1999 
(discussing the United States government's and the American Chamber of Commerce's urging the 
Japanese Labor Ministry to abandon the nation's lifetime employment system by adjusting the labor 
laws). 
II. See Roger Blanpain, Employment and Labour Law: The European Union, in COMPARATIVE 
LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 129 (Roger Blanpain, 
et a!. eds., 6th ed. 1998). Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom has championed the notion 
of a "third way," between the deregulation, low labor standards, and low unemployment of the United 
States and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and the heavy regulation, high labor standards, and 
high unemployment of the European nations. See, e.g., Roundtable Discussion: What the Experiences of 
the Recent Past Tell Us About the Labor and Employment Law Issues of the Future, 76 IND. L. J. 179, 
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So, does the labor law of the United States need to be changed as we 
move into the twenty-first century? And if it does, is there likely to be 
political support for changes that increase regulation of employers? 
B. The Labor Law/Employment Law Dichotomy 
"Labor and employment law" is what we in the United States call the 
area of law dealing with legal regulation of the employment relationship. 
Labor law is the name given to the law governing labor-management 
relations, primarily in unionized workplaces. 12 Employment law, on the 
other hand, is thought of as the body of law regulating principally non­
unionized workplaces. 13 Labor law deals primarily with the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA), 14 which protects the rights of employees to engage 
in collective bargaining and other forms of collective action. 15 Employment 
law encompasses the federal and state statutes and state case law regarding 
individual employment rights. 16 This dichotomy is not recognized in 
Europe and much of the rest of the world, where the term "labor law" is 
used to describe the whole body of law regulating the workplace. 17 
However, the workplace laws in many European nations are similar to those 
in the United States, at least in the topics they regulate. 
One could conclude that the labor law/employment law dichotomy is 
simply a matter of terminology and that it has had little influence on the 
183 (2001)  (comments of Professor Catherine Barnard of Trinity College, Cambridge University). The 
Italian government has announced plans to reform the nation's labor laws to make it easier to fire 
employees. See Government Says Strike Fails to Halt Plans to Overhaul Italy 's Law, Making Firing 
Easier, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 75, at A-5 (Apr.18,  2002). 
1 2. INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS, supra note 1, at 23-1; Eugene Scalia, 
Ending Our Anti-Union Federal Employment Policy, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 489, 489 (2001). 
13 .  Scalia, supra note 12, at 489. In 1988, Professor Steven Willborn, discussing the labor law 
that is taught in law schools, observed that "[f]or the vast majority of today's workers and employers, 
labor law is relevant only to the extent it considers individual employment rights, rights outside of the 
context of collective bargaining." Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard 
Economic Objection, 67 NEB. L. REV. 101, 102 (1988). 
This dichotomy between labor law and employment law is, of course, a generalization. Most 
employment laws also apply to unionized workplaces, although some provide exceptions for employers 
with collective bargaining obligations. Moreover, as this article will discuss, some of the labor law 
regulations of the NLRA also apply to nonunion employers. 
14. The Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
1 69) (1935). The current NLRA is  the Wagner Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley amendments of 
1947 and the Landrum-Griffin amendments of 1959. 
15. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wenzel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension 
Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 575, 575 ( 1992); Scalia, supra note 12, at 490; Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective 
Bargaining and Individual Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. 
L. REV. 687, 688 ( 1997). 
1 6. Stone, supra note 15,  at 576; Scalia, supra note 12, at 490; Bales, supra note 1 5, at 688-89. 
1 7. INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS, supra note 1, at 1 -2. 
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development of law governing the workplace. This is not the case, 
however. In the United States, labor law and employment law are distinct 
bodies of law regulating the workplace.18 Collective labor rights are one 
type of rights, and individual employment rights are another type of rights. 
On a theoretical level, this categorical way of thinking about labor (and 
employment) law has caused many lawmakers, labor law scholars, and 
practicing attorneys to fail to develop a holistic view of the law governing 
the workplace in the United States. 19 On a practical level, it has contributed 
to management and workers not being aware of rights that workers possess 
and remedies that are available to them for violations of those rights. 
While there may be a need to substantially overhaul the body of law 
regulating the employment relationship in the United States, it is doubtful 
that such a project will be undertaken by lawmakers absent an economic 
catastrophe. 20 Although studies may be conducted and reports may be 
issued,21 reform of labor law is likely to be heard not as a bang, but as a 
whimper.22 It is more likely that additional individual employment rights 
laws will be passed, assuming that sufficient political pressure can be 
brought to bear.23 While the proliferation of such laws is not inherently 
bad, they are not likely to assure most workers that they will have a 
workplace where they feel that they can perform their jobs safely and be 
treated in a fair and dignified manner by their supervisors and co-workers.24 
18. Scalia, supra note 12, at 489. 
19. Professor Stone argues that the individual employment rights regime is "a distinct and separate 
form of legal regulation" that is in tension with the old collective bargaining system of regulation. 
Stone, supra note 15, at 577. Professor Rabin has argued, however, that "[w]hile that may have seemed 
to be the initial dichotomy, l believe that the two approaches may be harmonized." Robert J. Rabin, The 
Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, U.S.F. L. REv. 169, 171 (1991). 
20. The Wagner Act was part of the New Deal response to the Great Depression. 1 THE 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 25 
(Patrick Hardin ed. , 3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW]; see also James J. 
Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1563, 1599 
(1996) ("There remains the possibility that economic and political crisis might trigger renewed 
congressional attention. The NLRA emerged from a crisis that disrupted public faith in an individual 
rights based common-law regime."). 
21. Consider, for example, President Clinton's Commission on the Future of Worker-Management 
Relations ("the Dunlop Commission"). Professor Paul Weiler, who served as Chief Counsel to the 
Commission, described the experience as beginning as "an enlightening and enjoyable experience," but 
having "a rather frustrating closing. " Paul C. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the 
Twenty-First Century, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 177 (2001). The much-ballyhooed Dunlop 
Commission submitted its report to the Senate in 1994. The report has provoked no legislative action. 
22. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 
NEB. L. REV. 7, 24 ( 1988) [hereinafter Summers, Labor Law] (" . . .  I fear that because of the wide 
variety of rights to be protected and our hesitant legal recognition of them, the solution must be 
piecemeal and will inevitably be incomplete."). 
23. !d. at 16-18. 
24. Michael Harper, A Framework for the Rejuvenation of the American Labor Movement, 761ND. 
L.J. l 01, 1 1 5 (2000). 
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Moreover, even if such laws are a good way of protecting workers, it may 
become increasingly difficult to get such laws enacted.25 
The objective of this article is neither to propose a redesigned 
comprehensive labor and employment. law regime nor to propose more 
individual employment rights laws to be patched onto the existing collage. 
Instead, the proposal in this article is more limited, but potentially quite 
useful. One of the existing laws that has fallen into relative desuetude, the 
NLRA, could and should be used to protect workers in more of their work­
related conduct.26 As we contemplate the employment law of the present 
and future, we might do well to reconsider the labor law of the past. While 
we await the coming of the great new employment law regime, we may 
have to make do with what we have. Breaking the labor law/employment 
law dichotomy may enable us to view labor law more broadly. If the 
current legal regime of individual employment rights is not completely 
satisfactory in its approach to or provision of rights or protections, we may 
find that the old approach is still useful. Thus, the objective of this article is 
to examine the rights of nonunion workers that the NLRA protects and to 
suggest minor changes in the law that will make these rights more widely 
known and more broadly asserted. 
C. A Reinvigoration of the NLRA 
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) provided a recent 
reminder of the continuing relevance of the NLRA to nonunion workplaces 
in its decision in Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio.21 In that decision, 
the Board overruled precedent and held that the "Weingarten right"28 
extends to the nonunion setting and entitles a nonorganized (not represented 
by a union) employee, upon request, to be accompanied by a co-worker at 
an investigatory interview by management that she reasonably believes may 
result in discipline. The D.C. Circuit subsequently enforced the Board's 
decision on the application of the Weingarten right to nonunion employees, 
although the court declined to enforce the retroactive application of the rule 
to the employer in the case before it, and the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari. 29 
25. See infra footnotes 72-75 and accompanying text. 
26. See, e.g., Calvin William Sharpe, "By Any Means Necessary"-Unprotected Conduct and 
Decisional Discretion Under the National Labor Relations Act, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 
207 (1999) ("[B]ecause it affords employees protection beyond or short of organizational activity, 
section 7 can potentially fill some of the void in employee protection resulting from recent declines in 
union membership."). 
27. 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000), enforced in part and rev'd in part, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001), 
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2356 (2002). 
28. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). 
29. Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. 
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The Board's decision in Epilepsy Foundation has generated 
considerable debate and controversy,30 in part because the issue is one on 
which the Board has vacillated over a twenty-year period.31 While 
extension of Weingarten hardly sounds like a right that will have the impact 
on protecting employees from adverse employment actions of, say, a new 
federal statute on employment discrimination32 or employee privacy.33 The 
decision could be helpful to unorganized employees who face the prospect 
of investigatory interviews, and it may raise some concerns for employers.34 
The decision 's principal impact could come not from its holding regarding 
denied, 122 S.Ct. 2356 (2002). 
30. See, e.g., Sam Heldman, Hilary E. Ball & Frederick T. Kuykendall III, Epilepsy Foundation of 
Northeast Ohio and the Recognition of Weingarten Rights in the Non-Organized Workplace: A 
Manifestly Correct Decision and a Seed for Further Progress, 1 7 LAB. LAW. 20 I (200 I) (arguing 
Board's decision was correct); M. Jefferson Starling III, Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio: A Case 
of Questiona ble Reasoning and Consequences, 17 LAB. LAW. 221 (2001) (arguing that the Board 
should reverse the decision); G. Rodger King, et a!., Who Let the Weingarten Rights Out? The National 
Labor Relations Board Compounds Earlier Error by the Supreme Court,  2002 MICH. ST. U. DET. C. L. 
L. REv. 149 (2002) (arguing that Weingarten was a misinterpretation of the NLRA, and that Epilepsy 
Foundat ion compounds the error); see also Attorneys Disagree About Wisdom of NLRB Extending 
Weingarten Rights, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 152, at C-1 (Aug. 7, 2000); Extension ofWeingarten 
Rights Debated at ABA Meet ing on Development of Act, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at C-1 (Feb. 21, 
2001). Eight trade associations filed an amicus brief with the D.C. Circuit, seeking to have the Board's 
decision in Epilepsy Foundqt ion overturned, to no avail. See Business Seeks Reversal of NLRB Ruling 
Extending Weingarten to Nonunion Workers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 95, at A-4 (May 16, 2001). 
31. In 1982, the Board held that the Weinga rten right extended to nonunion workers. Materials 
Research, 262 N .L.R.B. 10 I 0 ( 1982). Three years later, the Board reversed Materials Research, holding 
that the NLRA "compels" the conclusion that Weingarten applies only to employees represented by a 
union. Sears, Roebuck, 274 N .L.R.B. 230 (1985). In 1988, the NLRB again addressed the issue, 
rejecting the rationale of Materials Research that the NLRA compelled the nonapplication of 
Weingarten to nonunion employees, but still clinging to that result. E.I. DuPont, 289 N.L.R.B. 627 
(1988). 
The D.C. Circuit noted in its opinion that the Board had "come full circle" on the issue, returning to 
its Materials Research holding. Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio, 268 F.3d at 1097. The Board's 
vacillation on the issue did not dissuade the court, however, from according deference to the agency in 
its reasonable interpretation of section 7 of the NLRA. The court commented that, "[i]t is a fact of life 
in NLRB lore that certain substantive provisions of the NLRA invariably fluctuate with the changing 
compositions of the Board." Id. Of course the D.C. Circuit was correct about politics, and Epilepsy 
Foundation may not remain the law on the Weingarten right for long. See Management, Union 
Reactions Differ on D.C. Circuit Af irmance ofEpilepsy, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 215, at C-1 (Nov. 
8, 2001) (hereinafter Management, Union Reactions) (citing Daniel Yager, vice president and general 
counsel of LPA, Inc., stating that once the NLRB has a Republican majority Epilepsy Foundation may 
be overruled). 
32. See, for example, the proposed legislation discussed infra note 69 . 
33. See, for example, the proposed legislation discussed infra notes 71, 173. 
34. Regarding the possible impacts on employers, see Paul J. Siegel, Cutting-Edge Developments 
in Compliance: Labor & Employment Law Issues in ADVANCED CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WORKSHOP 
2001, 487, 548-550 (PLI) (predicting that "most profound implications" may be investigations of 
sensitive workplace matters such as sexual harassment); see also Judith E. Harris, Ethical Issues Arising 
in Labor and Employment Law in EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS LAW FOR THE CORPORATE 
COUNSEL AND THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER, 299, 326-27 (ALI-ABA 2002) (discussing confidentiality 
concerns in sexual harassment investigations). 
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the Weingarten right, but from its reminder that section 7 of the NLRA 
applies both to employees represented by a union and to unorganized 
employees. 
The scope of coverage of section 7 and its application to nonunion 
employees may have been one of the best-kept secrets of labor law.35 It 
also may be one of the best means for protecting employee rights in the 
United States in the twenty-first century. Who would have thought that the 
hoary NLRA might provide new hope in the era of individual employment 
rights? Some of the most distinguished labor law scholars in the nation 
have argued for broad interpretations of the section 7 right to engage in 
concerted activities for mutual aid or protection36 and have asserted the 
importance of that right in a nation where union representation is 
dwindling.37 In 1 989, Professor Charles Morris, suggesting a potential 
resurgence of the NLRA, said, "the National Labor Relations Act offers 
American industry and American workers an ideal framework in which to 
organize their relationships so that they will be able to compete more 
successfully in the world of the twenty-first century."38 For his vision of the 
NLRA to be realized, Morris suggested that the NLRB needed to develop a 
broader theory of section 7 protected activity and to enforce those rights 
adequately. 39 That has happened to some extent. 40 As union representation 
continues to decline, particularly in the private sector, a broad interpretation 
and application of section 7 in the nonunion workplace is even more 
important today than it was ten or twenty years ago. 
This article is not meant to suggest that it is time to give up on unions, 
35. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 2, at 1675 ("Many employers, perhaps most, and certainly most 
employees, are totally oblivious of the existence of this important body of law."); Cynthia Estlund, What 
Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the 
National Labor Relations Act, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 92 1 ,  939-40 n.93 ( 1 992) (discussing "popular 
perception that the NLRB deals only with cases involving union activity."); Peter D. DeChiara, The 
Right to Know: An Argument for Informing Employees of Their Rights Under The National Labor 
Relations Act, 32  HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 43 1 ( 1995) ("Most likely, the vast majority of non-union 
employees remain ignorant of this right, or are too fearful to exercise it."). 
36. 29 u.s.c. § 157 (2002). 
37. See Morris, supra note 2; Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual and the 
Requirement of"Concert" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286 ( 198 1). 
38 .  Morris, supra note 2, a t  1752-53. 
39. Id. 
40. Significantly, the Board's decision in E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 289 N.L.R.B. 627 (1988), 
maintaining that Weingarten rights did not apply to the nonunion workplace, was the impetus for 
Morris's article. In 1996, Professor Morris, along with Professors Clyde Summers, Joseph Grodin, and 
Ellen Dannin filed a petition with the NLRB requesting that the Board use its rulemaking power to 
extend the Weingarten right. See Professors Seek Expansion of Employee Rights at Disciplinary 
Interview, Daily Lab Rep. (BNA) No. 242, Sum-2 (Dec. 17, 1996). See also Richard Michael Fischl, 
Self. Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected Protest Activities Under the National Labor 
Relations Act, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. 789, 8 16- 19 (1989) (citing E.l. DuPont de Nemours as an example of 
the "promise of reciprocal benefit" requirement that infects the interpretation of "mutual aid or 
protection"). 
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nor that section 7 of the NLRA works fine without unions. Instead, the 
proposals herein are made in light of the reality that unions represent a 
small percentage of the workforce in the United States. Notwithstanding 
that reality, this article insists that the NLRA provides useful protection for 
employees who are not represented by unions.41 Far from being detrimental 
to unions, the increasing importance of section 7 in nonunion workplaces 
could create opportunities for unions to provide valuable services to 
nonunion employees and to cultivate organizing opportunities.42 If 
employees exercised their section 7 rights in nonunion workplaces and saw 
the need for, and power in, collective action, unions actually might benefit 
from increased interest among employees in union organizing. For 
example, the most important step toward increasing employee reliance on 
the protection of section 7 is to give employees notice of their rights. 
Unions could play a pivotal role by notifying employees of their section 7 
rights. Thus, increased reliance on and use of section 7 in the nonunion 
workplace would not diminish the need for unions; indeed, it might give 
them an opportunity to show why they are needed. 
Employers may not applaud the resurgence of the NLRA. Still, many 
management-side labor law attorneys prefer the law, structures, and 
procedures under the NLRA to the individual employment rights regime. If 
the choice is between expanded application of the NLRA and more 
individual employment rights law, employers may favor the NLRA. 
The next step is for the NLRB, the courts, Congress, employers, 
unions, and workers to recognize that a reinvigorated NLRA, applied to 
protect concerted employee expression and other concerted conduct in 
nonunion workplaces, is an important part of the body of law regulating the 
American workplace and not an archaic piece of New Deal legislation that 
applies only to employees represented by a union. If broadly interpreted 
and vigorously enforced, section 7 could obviate the need for some 
additional individual rights statutes. It could give employees a far-reaching 
protection that individual rights laws cannot. And, it could give employees 
considerable voice in their workplaces and some power to obtain better 
terms and conditions. For those concerned with the inadequacy of the 
individual employment rights regime for protecting workers, a 
reinvigorated NLRA is a refreshing prospect. It is no panacea for the 
problems of regulating the workplace and protecting workers, but it is an 
41.  Gorman & Finkin, supra note 37. In their 1981 article, Professors Gorman and Finkin said: 
" With the decline in the percentage and numbers of organized workers in the private sector over the past 
two decades, the NLRB appears increasingly to have become a source of protection against discipline in 
the absence of collective bargaining agreements and procedures." /d. at 288. With the continuing 
decline in union density since that declaration in 1981 ,  the NLRB is even more significant today. 
42. Cf Rabin, supra note 19 (arguing that unions may develop broader missions, beyond just 
acting as the collective bargaining agent for bargaining units; for instance, advising employees regarding 
their individual employment rights and helping employees enforce those rights). 
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opportunity to expand protection using existing law. Moreover, it may 
revive a sense among workers that they can identify the things that they 
want in the workplace, rather than relying on the federal or state 
government to determine what they need, and that they can then work 
together to obtain these objectives. 
Part II of this article chronicles the shift from the NLRA to individual 
employment rights laws and highlights some of the inadequacies of a 
system in which the individual rights laws are the predominant method of 
regulating the workplace. Part III considers the requirements for coverage 
under NLRA section 7, which guarantees the right to engage in concerted 
activities for mutual aid or protection. Part IV discusses a number of recent 
cases that illustrate the application of section 7 to the conduct of employees 
who are not represented by unions. Part V recommends changes in the law 
that would facilitate nonunion workers ' assertion of their section 7 rights. 
Part VI forecasts some possible results of a reinvigorated NLRA. 
II. 
LABOR LAW YESTERDAY, EMPLOYMENT LAW TODAY, 
AND LAW OF THE WORKPLACE TOMORROW 
A. Labor Law Yesterday 
To many traditional "real labor lawyers"43 labor law was about unions 
and management, getting down and dirty and fighting over representation 
and collective bargaining; it was about the NLRB and its regional offices. 
Many such labor lawyers, both on the management side and the labor side, 
bemoan the decline of the NLRA and the ascendancy of individual 
employment rights statutes.44 Many scholars also have decried the decline 
of the collective bargaining regime and its replacement by an individual 
employment rights paradigm.45 
43. Eugene Scalia provides a caricature of a "real labor lawyer": "Some practitioners still proudly 
identify themselves as 'real labor lawyers,' by which they mean they are of the cigar-chomping, rough­
and-tumble world of labor-management relations." Scalia, supra note 12, at 489. 
44. The author asserts this based on experience, having worked with some wonderful "real labor 
lawyers." One might attribute management attorneys' grudging affinity for the NLRA to a desire to 
limit remedies available to employees, but there may be more to it than that. After all, attorneys 
representing management may rail about the proliferation of employment legislation and judicially 
created theories of recovery, but at bottom, what they see are employment opportunities-for 
themselves. 
45. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 15, at 635-44 (enumerating five flaws in the "individual 
rights/minimal terms model"); Summers, Labor Law, supra note 22, at 26 (stating that none of the 
individual rights legislation gives workers a voice in the decisions affecting their lives in the workplace). 
Professor Kenneth Dau-Schmidt discusses the strengths and weaknesses of four different methods used 
to address the legal protection of workers: individual bargaining, collective bargaining, legislative 
regulation, and development of the common law. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands of 
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The Wagner Act was enacted in 1935.46 It was followed by the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938.47 The objective of enacting the 
FLSA was not to impinge upon the NLRA, but to set a floor for wages, 
hours, and child labor; it sought to set collective bargaining minimums from 
which unions could bargain upward.48 Organized labor and its friends 
supported the FLSA. The FLSA, however, represented a different approach 
to legal regulation of the workplace. The NLRA sought to invest the 
weaker party, workers, with more power so that they could decide what 
they wanted from the employer, make their demands known, and obtain 
whatever their collective power enabled them to obtain. Section 7, the heart 
of the Act, recognized the following general rights of employees: self­
organizing; forming, joining, or assisting labor organizations; bargaining 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing; engaging in 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection; and the right to abstain from the foregoing activities.49 
Everything that was legal was on the table under the NLRA-workers 
could try to obtain what they wanted.50 Other than the general section 7 
rights, nothing was made an inalienable right of the workers by the 
NLRA.51 This was the NLRA as interpreted through the lens of industrial 
pluralism. 52 In contrast, the FLSA declared a minimum wage, a maximum 
Workers into the Twenty-First Century: The Future of Labor and Employment Law, 68 IND. L.J. 683 
( 1993). Professor Brudney argues that the individual rights regime has not succeeded in achieving the 
goals of fair distribution of economic resources and providing workers an opportunity to participate in 
the management of the workplace. Brudney, supra note 20, at 1597-99; see also Rabin, supra note 19, 
at 171 (arguing that the "new workplace rights fail to provide workers with two essential ingredients of a 
sound workplace policy"-voice and muscle). 
46. See supra note 14. 
47. 52 Stat. 1060 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-2 19). 
48. Bales, supra note 15, at 698; Summers, Labor Law, supra note 22, at 9. 
49. 29 u.s.c. § 157. 
50. Professor William Gould, former Chairman of the NLRB, explains that "the genius of the New 
Deal is that it placed responsibility for the social contract in the hands of the parties themselves to be 
resolved through collective bargaining." William B. Gould IV, The Third Way: Labor Policy Beyond 
the New Deal, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 75 1, 754 (2000). See Scalia, supra note 12, at 490 (describing the 
NLRA as "constitutive," establishing a framework for employees to obtain for themselves what the 
individual rights employment laws provide by direct intervention). 
5 1 .  Senator Wagner's legislative assistant and the principal draftsman of the statute, Leon 
Keyserling, said, "[l]t was our view that the greatest contribution to greater equity and the distribution of 
the product between wages and profit would come, not through the definition of terms by government, 
but by the process of collective bargaining with labor placed in a position nearer to equality." Kenneth 
M. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. 
MIAMI L. Rev. 285, 3 1 9  (1987); see also id. at 362 ("The Wagner Act was in some ways a very 
conservative statute, because it says that there are a lot of things that the government ought not to 
decide. We should permit business and labor to decide them."). 
52. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 15,  at 622-24 (describing the industrial pluralist vision of the 
workplace as an "autonomous, self-sufficient, democratic realm" in which legislatures should not 
intervene); Reuel E. Schiller, From G roup Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, 
Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. I, 9 (1 999) (describing 
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number of hours before overtime was due, and minimum ages for engaging 
in work and in certain types of work. 53 These are rights that cannot be 
bartered for something else, even if employees prefer something else. 
B. Employment Law Today: Employment Law Sprawl 
In 1960 there were only two generally applicable federal labor acts. In 
1963, Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act.54 Since 1963, the following 
federal employment laws have been enacted: Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964/5 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),56 the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act),57 the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA),58 the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
(PDA),59 the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA),60 the Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act) ,61 the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),62 the Civil Rights Act of 1991,63 and 
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).64 The proliferation of 
such laws has created a veritable alphabet soup of federal individual 
employment rights legislation.65 And that is only the federal employment 
law. At the same time, state legislatures have passed numerous statues, 
some more or less tracking analogous federal statutes, such as state 
employment discrimination statutes, and some creating rights not 
recognized by federal law, such as wrongful discharge statutes and wage 
payment statutes. State courts have also been active in expanding 
individual employee rights in the workplace. They have recognized 
numerous contract and tort theories of recovery, including implied 
contracts, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory 
estoppel, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, invasion of 
the four basic tenets of industrial pluralism, including the subordination of individual rights to group 
rights to achieve collective power, and the role of the government as responsive-enforcing agreed upon 
terms-rather than prescriptive). 
53. See Scalia, supra note 12, at 490 ("Federal employment laws, most of which post-date the 
NLRA, supply directly many of the things that labor unions strive to achieve through bargaining."). 
54. 29 u.s. c. § 206(d) (2002). 
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-15 (2002). 
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633a (2002). 
57. 29 u.s.c. §§ 651-678 (2002). 
58. 29 u.s.c. §§ 1001-1461 (2002). 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (k) (2002). 
60. 29 u.s.c. §§ 2001-2009 (2002). 
61. 29 u.s.c. §§ 2101-2109 (2002). 
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq (2002). 
63. 42 U. S.C. § 1981a and scattered sections of Title VII (2002). 
64. 29 u.s.c. §§ 2601-2617,2651 & 2652 (2002). 
65. See generally INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS, supra note 1. 
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privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.66 In recent years, it 
has been the states that have been the innovators in employment rights 
laws; the last maj or federal legislation was the Family and Medical Leave 
Act, which was enacted in 1993.  
C. Law of the Workplace Tomorrow: 
More Individual Employment Rights? 
The NLRA and the collective bargaining approach is the law of the 
past, and the individual employment rights regime is the law of the 
present-and probably the future. The bottom line is that unions have not 
done the job of protecting a substantial portion of American workers, 
regardless of who or what is to blame for that fact, and the decline of 
collective rights and collective bargaining has been predictable. 67 Congress 
has given up on the group rights and collective action model of the NLRA 
and adopted the individual rights model for regulating the workplace.68 
However, if workers are to be given adequate protection by individual 
employment rights laws, more laws will be needed. More and more groups 
66. Professor Dau-Schmidt treats common law development as a separate method of employment 
regulation from legislative regulation. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 45, at 688-99. Although there are 
important differences, both confer individual rights and, to a great extent, leave enforcement of the 
rights to the individual. This article opts to distinguish between the rights created under the NLRA and 
individual employment rights. 
67. Summer, Labor Law, supra note 22, at 10 ("The consequence is foreseeable, if not inevitable; 
if collective bargaining does not protect the individual employee, the law will find another way to 
protect the weaker party. "). It may be, however, that Congress, state legislatures, and courts will 
become less sympathetic to the call to adjust for the inequality of bargaining power between employees 
and employers and instead consider the asserted needs of businesses to remain competitive in global 
markets. See Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment Law: Reflecting or Refracting 
Market Forces, 76 lND. LJ. 29, 46-48 (2001). 
68. Brudney, supra note 20, at 1571 ("At some point during this legislative barrage, it became 
clear that Congress viewed government regulation founded on individual employment rights, rather than 
collective bargaining between private entities, as the primary mechanism for ordering employment 
relations and redistributing economic resources. "); Schiller, supra note 52, at 73 ("Since the 1960s, the 
labor movement has suffered from American liberalism 's rejection of the group basis of its own past and 
its inability to find a place for group rights within the model of individual rights it clings to so dearly. "). 
During the ascendancy of the individual rights laws, lawmakers have been unwilling to amend the 
NLRA in some significant ways, which may have made it more relevant to contemporary workplace 
issues. Consider, for example, the failure of the Labor Reform Act of 1977, which would have amended 
the NLRA to provide for more effective remedies. S.2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1978); H.R. 8410, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The House bill passed in 1977. 123 Cong. Rec. 32, 613 (1977). The Senate 
bill was killed by filibuster. 124 Cong. Rec. 18, 398, 18,400 ( 1978). A second example is the numerous 
defeats of striker replacement bills, which would have prohibited the hiring of permanent replacements 
during strikes. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, A Proposa l for Procedural Limitations on Hiring 
Permanent Striker Repla cements: "A Far, Far Better Thing" Than the Workplace Fairness Act, 72 N.C. 
L. REv. 813 (1994). More recently, the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act (S. 295, H.R. 
743), which would have amended the NLRA to give employers greater flexibility in establishing labor­
management committees, was passed by Congress and vetoed by President Clinton. See Clinton Vetoes 
TEAM Act Despite Pleas From Business for Passage, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 147 (July 31, 1996). 
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will need to be protected by employment discrimination laws.69 Employees 
are being mistreated and abused by supervisors and co-workers, and there is 
an outcry against workplace bullying along with proposals to address it 
through law. 7° Furthermore, Congress and state legislatures have only 
begun considering how to protect employees' privacy interests in light of 
recent innovations in technology and science.71 
While more individual employment rights laws may be needed to 
address emerging workplace issues, it is doubtful that the politics of the 
United States in the new global economy will support ever-increasing 
regulation of employers.72 U.S. businesses will oppose increased employee 
69. Consider, for example, H.R. 323, 1 07th Cong. (200 1); S. 318, 1 07th Cong. (200 1). Both of 
the preceding bills would prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of genetic information. See 
Sen. Kennedy to Address Genetic Bias Bill's Overlap of ADA, Privacy Regulations, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 143, at A-1 (July 26, 2001)  (discussing S. 318). In 2001,  Louisiana enacted state legislation 
prohibiting employment discrimination based on "protected genetic information. " 2001 La. Acts 330 
(codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 23; 302 (5)-(8) & 23:368-69); see also Louisiana Governor Signs Bill 
Banning Genetic Bias in Employment, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 120, at A-4 (June 22, 2001). Most 
states now have laws addressing genetic discrimination, although not all cover employment 
discrimination. See Impetus Is Growing, But Is There A Need for Law Barring Genetic Discrimination, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 57, at C- 1 (March 25, 2002). Turning from employment discrimination 
based on genetic information to discrimination based on sexual orientation, the Employment Non­
Discrimination Act ("ENDA"), which would amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit 
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, was reintroduced in the House and Senate on 
July 31 ,  200 I. EDNA was approved by the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee 
on April 24, 2002, and it could be scheduled for a full Senate vote before the Fall 2002 elections. See 
Senate Committee Approves Bill Banning Sexual Orientation Bias in the Workplace, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 80, at AA-1 (Apr. 25, 2002). That bill was first introduced in 1994. ENDA Will be Re­
Introduced in Congress on July 31, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 145, at A-8 (July 30, 2001). 
70. See David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying " and the Need for Status­
Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475 (2000); see also Oklahoma Fixture Co. & 
Carpenters, Local 943, 01-02 Arb. (CCH) para. 3912 (2001) (Shieber, Arb.) (overturning discharge of 
employee for insubordination where employee was provoked by supervisor's bullying behavior). 
71. See, e.g. , the genetic discrimination bills cited supra note 69, and the Notice of Electronic 
Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, 107th Cong. (2000), which would have limited the circumstances under 
which employers could electronically monitor employees. See also Business Coalition Blocks Mar!.11p 
of Bill Requiring Electronic Monitoring Notification, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 80, at A-9 (Sept. 15, 
2000). 
72. This argument goes beyond short-term party-in-power limitations, which advocates of labor 
law reform have discussed regarding the current Republican administration and its appointments to the 
Board and the general counsel. See, e.g., Heldman, supra note 30, at 220 ("We do not predict with 
confidence that, in the next few years, a newly appointed general counsel will advocate, or that a 
changing NLRB will accept, broad new rights for employees."). Pro-labor legislation is politically 
dangerous even for pro-labor politicians. President Clinton, a Democrat, had the support of organized 
labor in his presidential campaigns. He promised to sign the Workplace Fairness Act (the striker 
replacement bill), which was organized labor's legislative priority, into law if it made it to his desk. 
Aide Reaffirms Clinton Support for Workplace Fairness Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 73 (Apr. 18, 
1 994). Some have questioned, however, how hard the President worked to make sure that it got to his 
desk; the two Arkansas Democrats were among the senators who would not vote to invoke cloture and 
avert a Republican-led filibuster. See NLRB Member Devaney Tells Management to Prepare for Bumpy 
Ride with New Board, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 94 (May 18, 1994) (discussing rumor in Washington, 
D.C. that President Clinton was not willing to "twist arms, " including those of the two Arkansas 
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protections, raising the politically powerful argument that they cannot 
compete in global markets when the law is over-regulating and restricting 
them.73 For example, the governor of California, a Democrat, vetoed a bill 
for the third consecutive year that would have restricted employers' 
monitoring of employees ' e-mail and computer files, citing, in part, his 
concern about burdening employers with another regulation.74 For 
politicians, even traditionally pro-worker Democrats, labor and employment 
laws are incendiary. 75 
A second concern with an approach to workplace regulation dominated 
by individual employment rights is whether such a regime provides an 
adequate forum in which employees can effectively vindicate their rights. 
Some commentators have made the argument that it is unrealistic to believe 
that an individual employment rights system that depends on plaintiffs 
suing in federal or state court can adequately address more than a fraction 
of worker complaints.76 A companion concern is whether there are enough 
lawyers willing to take the cases. 77 These concerns may have been 
assuaged somewhat by routing individual employment rights cases into 
alternative dispute resolution. 78 While ADR may be efficient for employers 
senators, to win passage of the act). Globalization and free trade exert pressures to resist increased labor 
law regulation that likely will subdue all politicians except perhaps the staunchest champions of labor. 
73. On this argument, see for example, Schwab, supra note 67, at 34 (predicting that "(m]ore 
frequently will the argument be heard and accepted that a country cannot afford extravagant 
employment-law protections when other countries are only providing efficient protections"); see also 
Dau-Schmidt, supra note 45, at 697-98 (discussing this issue as one of the limitations of the legislative­
regulation approach to legally protecting workers). 
74. See Privacy Bill for Employee E-Mail Vetoed for Third Time by California Gov. Davis, Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 195 (Oct. 1 1, 2001). 
75. Deron Zeppelin, Director of Government Affairs for the Society for Human Resource 
Management, expressed it this way: "Most members of Congress, believe it or not, do not like to vote on 
[employment] issues, period. It is not fun to be labeled either anti-worker or pro-business. Most of 
them will run for the hills before they have to vote on them." See Hill Watchers Foresee Little Activity 
on the Labor and Employment Law Front, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 153 (Aug. 9, 2001). 
76. Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System of Employment Law, 
69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 154 (1993) ("It would be hard, however, to find anyone who believes that 
the nation has enough judges and courthouses to make common law litigation the modal institution of 
employee grievance processing."). 
77. See Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and 
Proposals, 1 4 1  U. PA. L. REv. 457, 467-68 (1992) [hereinafter Summers, Effective Remedies] ("Because 
of litigation costs, all but middle and upper income employees are largely foreclosed from any access to 
a remedy for wrongful dismissal. . . .  Lower income employees without substantial tort claims will have 
difficulty finding a lawyer."); Alternative Dispute Resolution: Mandatory Arbitration Better for Workers 
With EEOC, Courts Stretched, Professor Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 5 1 ,  at C-2 (Aug. 6, 1997) 
(quoting Professor Theodore St. Antoine as stating that experienced attorneys accept only about one out 
of every hundred potential discrimination cases because the rest are not worth their time). 
78. The Supreme Court recently extolled the virtues of arbitration agreements in employment and 
held that employment contracts are not generally exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act's requirement 
that valid arbitration agreements be enforced. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).  
However, the effect of the Supreme Court's most recent decision on arbitration remains to be seen. See 
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). In Waj]Ie House, the Court held that the EEOC 
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and employees, new concerns arise when the cases are channeled into 
mandatory arbitration. 79 Employers have advantages in mandatory 
arbitration, such as the repeat player advantage, that may deprive employees 
of an adequate opportunity to vindicate violation of their rights. Employer 
advantages in mandatory arbitrations can be alleviated where arbitration of 
an employee's claim takes place under a collective bargaining agreement in 
which the union provides representation, as the union can balance the 
employer's advantages (such as repeat player). However, the question 
remains whether an ef icient and fair forum has been found for adjudication 
of employment claims. 
A third concern with a regime of individual employment protections is 
that statutory and common law protections can overlap to such an extent 
that the system does not function well. Professor Summers, warning of this 
problem years ago, 80 predicted that a body of employment law with too 
many cumulative rights and remedies would "hold out promises to the 
employee, harass and impoverish the employer, enrich the lawyers, and 
clog the legal machinery."81 The overlaps are now a major concern with the 
existing statutes. For example, does an employee who has a "serious health 
condition" under the FMLA also have a "disability" under the ADA so that 
the employee is entitled not only to twelve weeks of leave, but also to 
reasonable accommodation? The overlaps among the ADA, the FMLA, 
could bring an enforcement action for all statutory remedies, including backpay, reinstatement, and 
compensatory and punitive damages, even though the discharged employee had entered into an 
arbitration agreement with his employer. 
The EEOC has opposed mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination claims. See generally 
EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, No. 9 1 5.002 (July 10, 1997). For a critique of the 
EEOC's position, see Beth M. Primm, Comment, A Critical Look at the EEOC 's Policy Aga inst 
Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitra tion Agreements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 151 (1999). However, in 
1999, the EEOC launched a voluntary mediation program that has, by the Commission's account, been 
very successful. Commission 's Voluntary Mediation Program is Off to Strong Start, Chairwoman 
Asserts, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 232, at A-3 (Dec. 3, 1999); EEOC 's Mediation Program Going 
Strong Despite Budget Shortfall, Coordinators Say, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 59, at B-1 (March 27, 
2000). 
79. See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice-But By How Much? Questions Gilmer Did 
Not Answer, 16 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 589, 601-22 (2001 )  (discussing matters that should be 
considered by courts in deciding whether to enforce mandatory arbitration agreements-neutrality of 
arbitral forum, arbitral control over discovery, limitations on limitations periods and remedies, allocation 
of costs of arbitration, and mutuality regarding mandatory nature of arbitration); Carrie Menkel­
Meadow, Do the "Haves " Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 
1 5  OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 43-44 (1999) (discussing study results that repeat players and 
higher-level employees with resources for representation fare better in mandatory arbitration); Marcela 
Noemi Siderman, Comment, C ompulsory Arbitration Agreements Worth Saving: Reforming Arbitration 
to Accommodate Title VJJ Protections, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1885, 1 9 1 1 - 1 9 1 8  (2000) (discussing 
inadequacies of current mandatory arbitration systems-lack of public accountability, limited discovery, 
no jury, selection of arbitrators, advantage of repeat players, and limitation of remedies). 
80. Summers, Labor Law, supra note 22, at 18 (predicting that "[t]he most difficult problem of the 
near future will be reconciling overlapping protections"). 
81 .  Jd. 
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and states' workers compensation laws are legendary and have given rise to 
a cottage industry of continuing legal education. In addition, the proposed 
federal legislation prohibiting discrimination based on genetic information 
raised a number of questions in the Senate committee about overlaps with 
the ADA. 82 There are also overlaps among the employment discrimination 
statutes, particularly under the theory of harassment, and state tort 
theories. 83 
A fourth concern, and the one most relevant to the proposal in this 
article, is employment law's provision of minimal terms. The rights 
specified in the statutes are not always what employees want or need and 
they may prefer to trade the statutory right for what they actually want or 
need. As one commentator put it, "employees often know better than 
Washington Bureaucrats how to improve their workplace."84 The 
limitations of the employment statutes are a product of their specification of 
minimum rights.85 For example, under the FMLA, a covered worker is 
entitled to twelve weeks of unpaid leave. While this is an important right 
for many employees, it is also a right that many employees would not 
choose to assert. Similarly, the right to overtime pay for working over forty 
hours in a week under the FLSA is a valuable right to many employees. 
However, many employees would prefer to barter this right for something 
else. Yet, employment statutes take away that option. The employment 
discrimination statutes all prohibit employers from taking adverse 
employment actions based on an employee's membership in a protected 
class. Practically, these statutes ensure one type of fairness for some 
employees. 86 It is this limitation of employment rights laws that both 
renders them ineffective for many employees and ensures that there will be 
many more of them as more rights and classes are identified that need to be 
protected and that have sufficient political support. 87 
82. See Sen. Kennedy to Address Genetic Bias Bill's Overlap of ADA, Privacy Regulations, Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 143, at A-1 (July 26, 2001) (discussing S. 318); see also Impetus Is Growing, But 
Is There A Need for Law Barring Genetic Discrimination, supra note 69. The EEOC sued Burlington 
Northern Santa Fe Railway Co. for genetic testing of employees, alleging a violation of the ADA. On 
May 6, 2002, the case was settled for $2.2 million. See EEOC's First Genetic Testing Challenge Settled 
for $2.2 Million, Parties Announce, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 90, at A-1 (May 9, 2002). 
83. See, e.g., Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective 
Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 330 (1990). 
84. Scalia, supra note 12, at 493. 
85. See, e.g., Dau-Schrnidt, supra note 45, at 697; Stone, supra note 15,  at 637. Professor Schwab 
predicts that future employment laws will emphasize default rules that can be varied rather than 
mandatory rules. Schwab, supra note 67, at 41-42. He may be correct, but that will require movement 
away from a trend that has held for at least four decades. 
86. Harper, supra note 24, at 117-18 (explaining that wrongful termination and employment 
discrimination laws protect employees from some types of arbitrary or inequitable treatment, but not 
other types); see also Yamada, supra note 70, at 523 (arguing that all workplace harassment is hur tful, 
and status-based harassment protection law should be expanded to status-blind harassment protection). 
87. Professor Stone articulated some of the above four criticisms and added others in her five 
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What employees need to ensure fairness, safety, and dignity in the 
workplace is a flexible right that can be exercised when they identify a 
problem. The right must empower employees to identify problems with the 
terms and conditions of their employment and to take action to remedy the 
problems. If the employer retaliates because of the employees' attempt to 
remedy the problem, then the law should provide a remedy. Such a law 
would empower workers to manage their own careers. 88 It is a pleasant 
surprise to find that we already have a statute that, with a little refinement, 
provides some of that protection. It is section 7 of the NLRA, and it has 
been discovered and used by many nonunion employees. For the potential 
of section 7 to be fully realized in nonunion workplaces, however, it needs 
some tinkering.89 Even without adjustments, however, it still constitutes a 
useful and underused right. 
III. 
BACK TO THE FUTURE 
A. The "Secret " of Epilepsy Foundation 
It is hard to predict how much will change in the nonunion workplace 
because of the Board's extension of Weingarten rights to nonunion 
criticisms of the individual rights statutes: I) such statutes provide no opportunity for corporate 
decisionmaking; 2) such statutes provide no avenue for expressing discontent with voice rather than exit; 
3) minimal terms are too rigid to address preferences of employees at all workplaces; 4) minimal terms 
are not effective because above a very low level they cannot make meaningful improvements; and 5) the 
model is inherently unstable because without an organized constituency, the minimal rights are 
vulnerable and transitory. Stone, supra note 15, at 636-38. 
88. Schwab, supra note 67, at 4 1 .  
89. The remedies provided for under the NLRA are not as lucrative as the damages available 
under some individual rights statutes and theories. The remedial provision in the NLRA states that if the 
Board finds an unfair labor practice was committed, it "shall issue and cause to be served on such person 
an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such 
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effect the 
policies of the Act." 29 U.S.C. § 1 60(c). Thus, the typical monetary remedy to a charging party is back 
pay with interest. This remedy often has been criticized as inadequate. See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Promises 
to Keep: Securing Workers ' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769, 
1787-9 1 ( 1 983). I favor enhanced remedies. Some enhanced remedies were proposed in the ill-fated 
Labor Reform Act of 1977. S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1 978); H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1 st Sess. 
(1 977). Section 8 of that proposed legislation would have provided for several harsher remedies: a ban, 
up to a maximum of three years, on government contracts for employers that willfully violated a Board 
order or court decree enforcing a Board order; double back pay for employees unlawfully discharged 
during union organizing campaigns or during the period from recognition of the union until a first 
collective bargaining agreement is reached; and compensations for employees whose employer violates 
its bargaining duty regarding a first contract. Section 9 would have made preliminary injunctions under 
§ 10(1)  of the NLRA, § 29 U.S.C. 160(1 )  (1998), applicable to discharges during organizing campaigns 
or during the period from recognition of a union until the parties enter into a first collective bargaining 
agreement. The House passed the bill on October 6, 1977. 123 Cong. Rec. 32, 613  (1 977). The Senate 
bill died on the Senate floor due to filibuster. 1 24 Cong. Rec. 18, 398, 18, 400 ( 1 978). 
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employees in Epilepsy Foundation.90 There are reasons to believe that not 
much will change. First, an employer does not have to advise an employee 
of her right to representation; the right is triggered when the employee 
requests to be accompanied by a co-worker.91 Second, if an employee 
asserts her Weingarten right, the employer may choose to forego the 
investigatory interview and to make a disciplinary decision without the 
benefit of the interview.92 Still, as Professor Morris observed, the 
Weingarten right "provide[s] an excellent training opportunity for nonunion 
employees to acquire and improve their organizational skills."93 
Epilepsy Foundation is most important because it clearly proclaims 
that the Section 7 rights of the NLRA are not limited to employees 
represented by a union. This fact is not well known beyond labor and 
employment lawyers, but perhaps it will gain some notoriety now.94 All 
workers have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. This is an 
important, flexible right that allows employees to identify problems at work 
and to attempt to remedy them without fear of reprisal. Until recently, 
many employees have had no idea that the NLRA applied to them and thus 
have not exercised these rights. Section 7 does apply, and if properly 
invoked by workers and properly interpreted by the Board and federal 
courts of appeals, it can protect some employees engaged in certain types of 
workplace concerted conduct that is not covered by existing individual 
employment rights laws.95 It is, of course, trite by now to say that collective 
bargaining is not likely to provide legal protection to a substantial part of 
the workforce in the United States in the twenty-first century. But we need 
not conflate the NLRA and collective bargaining as we tend to do under the 
labor law/employment law dichotomy. This is not new law, but it is 
valuable old law that relatively few people know, or if they know, use. 
90. 33 1 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000), enforced in part and reversed in part, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2356 (2002). 
91 .  See, e.g., Management, Union Reactions, supra note 3 1  (quoting management attorney 
Maurice Baskin as saying "[e]mployers do not have to notify employees of their rights but should be 
ready to deal with the issue when an employee raises it"). 
92. ld 
93. Morris, supra note 2, at 1 749. 
94. The Supreme Court of the United States made this point in its 1962 decision NLRB v. 
Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). Is it reasonable to expect recent decisions by the NLRB 
and the D.C. Circuit to publicize a legal principle that a Supreme Court opinion clearly states? Perhaps. 
First, the Washington Aluminum case is almost forty years old, and a recent reminder helps people 
remember or learn for the first time. Second, Epilepsy Foundation states the principle in the context of a 
specific rule that applies to a particular workplace scenario, and this specificity may help people 
remember. 
95. Cf Heldman, supra note 30, at 220 (advocating a "renewed focus on other aspects of section 7 
rights in the non-organized 'workplace' and encouraging 'creative advocacy' in pushing section 7 rights 
in the nonunion setting"). 
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B. The Section 7 Right to Engage in Concerted Activity for 
Mutual Aid or Protection 
The Section 7 right that is relevant to this discussion is the right "to 
engage in . . .  concerted activities for the purpose of . . .  mutual aid or 
protection."96 While no union activity or even nascent union organizing 
activity is required, there are several specific requirements for the activity to 
be covered under section 7: 1) it must be concerted; 2) it must be for the 
objective of mutual aid or protection; and 3) the nature of the activity must 
not be unlawful, too disloyal to the employer, in breach of contract, or such 
that it undermines the authority of a labor organization that represents a 
majority of the employees in a bargaining unit.97 Section 8(a)(1)98 is the 
unfair labor practice provision that correlates with interference with, 
restraint of, or coercion of employees in the exercise of their section 7 
rights. If the employer discriminates or retaliates against the employee for 
engaging in protected activity, an unfair labor practice occurs under Section 
8(a)(3).99 
1. Concerted 
This is the most important requirement of Section 7 activity in a 
nonunion workplace because it is the one that is most likely not to be 
satisfied. 100 The most obvious interpretation of "concerted" is that the 
activity must be engaged in by more than one employee. Practically, that is 
the safest definition to provide guidance to workers in planning their 
conduct, but that is not the limit of the Board's interpretation of the term. 
Professor Morris has clearly articulated that Section 7 protects both 
concerted activity and the right to engage in concerted activity, and that 
there is a difference. 101 Activity by a single employee can be an exercise of 
the right to engage in concerted activity.102 On the other hand, a "personal 
gripe" made by one employee for her personal benefit alone is not 
concerted. 103 In 1951, the Board stated in Root Carlin, Inc. ,  104 that "the 
96. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2002). The omitted language covers concerted activities for purposes of 
collective bargaining. 
97. Morris, supra note 2, at 1689-90; see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 20, at 
73-75; Sharpe, supra note 26, at 208. 
98. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)( l)  (2002). See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 20, at 73. 
99. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2002). See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 20, at 73. 
I 00. Morris, supra note 2, at 1690. 
101 .  !d. at 1679. 
102. NLRB v. Main Street Terrace Care Center, 2 18  F.3d 53 1, 539 (6th Cir. 2000) ("It is well 
settled that 'an individual employee may be engaged in concerted activity when he acts alone."') 
(quoting NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 83 1 (1 984)). 
1 03. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 37, at 290-93 (citing as factors in the conclusion that an 
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guarantees of Section 7 extend to concerted activity which in its inception 
involves only a speaker and a listener, for such activity is an indispensable 
preliminary step to employee self-organization."105 Thus, there is a type of 
activity engaged in by a single employee that qualifies for Section 7 
protection, which may be termed "constructive concerted activity."106 
In A lleluia Cushion, 107 the Board articulated an expansive, employee­
friendly standard for determining when single-employee conduct constitutes 
concerted activity. In that case, a lone employee who complained to his 
employer about safety conditions and was not satisfied with the employer's  
response wrote a letter to the state OSHA office. The employer discharged 
the employee the day after an OSHA inspector toured the plant.108 The 
Board stated that there was no evidence that the employee had discussed the 
safety problems with other employees, solicited their support, or requested 
their help in preparing the letter to OSHA.109 Nonetheless, the Board found 
concerted activity and articulated the following standard for determining 
when an employee's action is concerted activity: "[W]here an employee 
speaks up and seeks to enforce statutory provisions relating to occupational 
safety designed for the benefit of all employees, in the absence of any 
evidence that fellow employees disavow such representation, we will fmd 
an implied consent thereto and deem such activity to be concerted."no 
In Meyers I, 1 1 1  the Board repudiated the standard of Alleluia Cushion. 
Meyers I involved an employee who complained to a state transportation 
agency about his employer 's failure to remedy safety defects in his truck. 
The Board stated that the statutory language of Section 7 requires some 
concert-in-fact, and that there can be no implied concert. The D.C. Circuit 
reversed the decision on the ground that the definition of concerted action 
articulated by the Board was not mandated by the NLRA. On remand, in 
Meyers II, the Board reaffirmed its rule from Meyers I that "to find an 
employee's activity to be 'concerted' [it must] be engaged in with or on the 
authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the 
expression is a "personal gripe" the following: action taken alone and without prior planning or 
discussion with other employees; actor's motive is to advance self-interest; and favorable resolution of 
complaint would not likely improve other employees' working conditions). 
104. 92 N.L.R.B. 1313 (1951). 
1 05. !d. at 13 14. 
1 06. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 37, at 293-99; Morris, supra note 2, at 1709. 
107. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 ( 1975). 
I 08. The OSHA representative was asked whether the employee could be terminated. He 
responded that he could not be fired for filing the complaint, but he could be terminated for poor work 
performance. !d. at 999. 
109. ld. 
1 10. !d. at 1000. 
I l l . 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), rev'd sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985), decision on remand, Meyers Indus., 281 NLRB 882 (1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 
1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988). 
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employee himself." 1 12 This was a more restrictive, less employee-friendly 
standard than the Alleluia Cushion standard. The Meyers II standard 
excludes from coverage many acts engaged in by a single employee which 
would have been considered "constructively" concerted under the Alleluia 
Cushion standard. As the Board said, the Meyers II standard is "expansive 
enough to include individual activity that is connected to collective 
activity."1 13 Meyers II has been criticized by commentators who believe 
that Alleluia Cushion was a permissible interpretation of the statutory 
requirement of concertedness. 1 14 Nonetheless, though individual employees 
would be given a wider berth to engage in constructive concerted action 
under the Alleluia Cushion standard, the Meyers II standard has permitted 
the Board and courts to find some activity undertaken by lone employees to 
be concerted, as will be discussed below. 
A finding of concerted activity is only one element of an employee's 
case. Under the Board's proof structure established in Wright Line, 1 15 the 
General Counsel must prove the existence of the protected concerted 
activity, the employer's knowledge or belief that the protected concerted 
activity occurred, and that the adverse action was motivated by the 
protected concerted activity."6 For example, in Air Surrey Corp. v. 
NL.R.B. , 1 17 the activity for which the employee was fired was concerted, 
but the court of appeal concluded that the employer did not know of the 
concerted nature of the activity and thus found against the employee. In 
that case, the colleagues who accompanied the discharged employee to the 
bank to verify that the employer 's level of funds on reserve was adequate to 
meet payroll disclaimed their involvement when confronted by the 
employer. The "knowledge of concertedness" requirement is controversial 
and has been criticized as being based on a misinterpretation of the NLRA 
and as frustrating the objectives of the Act. 1 18 
1 12. 281 N.L.R.B. at 885. 
1 13. Id. 
1 14. See, e.g. , Morris, supra note 2, at 1722. 
1 1 5. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 ( 1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 198 1), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 
(1 982). 
1 1 6. Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497; see also NLRB v. McEver Eng'g, Inc., 784 F.2d 634, 640 (5th 
Cir. 1986) ("Before an employer can be held to have discriminated against its employees for their 
protected activity, the Board must show that the supervisor responsible for the alleged discriminatory 
action knew about the protected activity, and that the employees' protected activity was a motivating 
factor in the employer's decision."); Timekeeping Sys., 323 N.L.R.B. 244 ( 1997) (same); United Ass'n 
of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting lndust., 328 N.L.R.B. 1079 (1 999) 
(same). 
1 17. 601 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1979), denying enforcement of229 N.L.R.B. 1 064. 
1 1 8. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 37, at 351-53. 
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2. For Mutual Aid or Protection 
The Board went to great pains in Meyers II to develop a standard for 
concertedness that did not render it redundant with "for mutual aid or 
protection."1 19 Most discussions of the scope of "for mutual aid or 
protection" begin with the Supreme Court's decision in Eastex, Inc. v. 
N.L.R.B . . 1 20 In that case, the Court addressed an employer's refusal to 
circulate in nonworking areas of the plant a union newsletter that criticized 
a presidential veto of an increase in the minimum wage and that urged 
employees to write to their state legislators in opposition to the 
incorporation of a right-to-work law in the state constitution. The Court 
rejected the employer's argument that efforts to improve working 
conditions through channels beyond the immediate employer-employee 
relationship are unprotected under the NLRA. The Court distinguished 
between the relatively narrow scope of the Section 7 protection of "self­
organization" and "collective bargaining" and the relatively broad scope of 
the Section 7 protection of "mutual aid or protection."12 1 The Court did not 
give a concrete standard for determining the outer boundary of "mutual aid 
or protection." Instead, it held that "some concerted activity bears a less 
immediate relationship to employees' interests as employees than other 
such activity [and] at some point the relationship becomes so attenuated that 
an activity cannot fairly be deemed to come within the . . .  clause."122 In 
short, the activity must be reasonably related to wages, hours, or other terms 
and conditions of employment. 123 The foregoing standard does not give 
much guidance or predictability, and courts finding conduct not to satisfy 
the standard often state in conclusory terms that there is an insufficient 
nexus or relationship between the conduct at issue and employee concerns 
about employment related matters. 1 24 
The Court's Eastex interpretation of "mutual aid or protection" 
generally has been interpreted as giving a fairly broad, pro-worker scope. 125 
Professor Cynthia Estlund, however, has characterized the standard, as 
interpreted in subsequent cases, as narrower than it might and should be. 126 
Comparing the Section 7 cases with public employee free speech cases, she 
characterizes the interpretation of "mutual aid or protection" this way: 
119. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 885. 
1 20. 437 u.s. 556 (1978). 
121. !d. at 565-67. 
122. !d. at 567-68. 
123. Morris, supra note 2, at 1705. 
124. See, e.g., Tradesmen Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1137, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting the 
Board's interpretation of the standard that conduct intended to "level the playing field" between union 
and non-union employers is for "mutual aid or protection"). 
125. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 20, at 144-45. 
126. Estlund, supra note 35, at 928. 
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"some speech on matters beyond the actual terms and conditions of 
employment-even on matters over which the employer has no direct 
control-may gain section 7 protection, but only if it can be linked to a 
traditional self-interested economic objective."127 This criticism is also 
directed at the broad loss of protection of activities that satisfy both 
concertedness and "mutual aid or protection" but lose protection for other 
reasons discussed in the next section.128 Professor Estlund' s proposed 
reinterpretation of "mutual aid or protection" would, within a very broad 
range of work-related topics, leave it to employees to decide what was for 
their protection and would not second guess them. 129 Thus, employees 
would not be required to show that they had acted in their own economic 
self-interest to satisfy the "mutual aid or protection" requirement. For 
example, product disparagement based on concern for safety or service to 
the public would be for mutual aid or protection. Generally, employee 
conduct motivated by social or public interest concerns would come within 
the ambit of "mutual aid or protection."130 
3. Limitation for Egregious, Opprobrious, Illegal, and Disloyal Conduct 
Even if conduct is deemed to be concerted and for mutual aid or 
protection, it still may not be protected under section 7.  The Board and the 
courts have developed a common law exception to section 7 protection 
where the employee engages in bad faith conduct. 13 1  Such conduct may be 
considered in bad faith because of either the nature of the activity or the 
purpose of the activity. 132 The Board has described the degree of badness 
required to lose protection as "so flagrant, violent, or extreme as to render 
[the employees] unfit for service." 133 Conduct that is illegal is one type of 
such conduct. In addition, violent, disruptive, or disloyal conduct is not 
protected under Section 7. 134 Determining whether conduct loses protection 
requires a balancing of the interests of the employer against the section 7 
rights of the employee.135 Depending on how the balance is struck, this can 
be a substantial limitation on protected activity, as almost all concerted 
127. !d. ; see also Fischl, supra note 40. 
128. See infra notes - and accompanying text. 
129. Estlund, supra note 35, at 974. 
130. Estlund, supra note 35, at 949-60. 
131. ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 302 (1976). 
132. !d. at 302-318; Morris, supra note 2, at 1704-1708. 
133. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 309, 315 (1975), enforced, 544 F.2d 320 (7th 
Cir. 1976). 
134. Morris, supra note 2, at 1707-08. For an excellent discussion of the types of activity found to 
be unprotected and an appendix that is a "typology of unprotected conduct cases," see Sharpe, supra 
note 26. 
135. Morris, supra note 2, at 1708. 
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activity for mutual aid or protection which results in unfavorable 
employment action is adverse to the employer. 136 At what point does such 
activity become so adverse as to be termed "disloyal" and lose protection? 
The most significant case on this issue is Jefferson Standard 
Broadcasting. 131 In that case, television technicians, who were on strike and 
picketing, distributed leaflets that criticized the quality of programming 
offered to the public by the employer television station. The Supreme 
Court held that the activity was not protected. The Court first stated the 
general legal principle that "insubordination, disobedience, or disloyalty is 
adequate cause for discharge.'ms The Court then explained that the product 
disparagement at issue did not relate to a labor practice of the company and 
was made in the interest of the public rather than in the interest of the 
employees.139 The Court then held that, even if the conduct was concerted 
and for mutual aid or protection, the means used by the technicians defeated 
section 7 protection. 140 
The Jefferson Standard decision has been heavily criticized. In 
dissent, Justice Frankfurter objected to the vagueness of the principles 
articulated by the majority: "[T]o float such imprecise notions as 
'discipline' and 'loyalty' in the context of labor controversies, as the basis 
of a right to discharge, is to open the door wide to individual judgment by 
Board members and judges." 141 The cases have shown that the amorphous 
standard does not lead to predictability, as very similar cases have yielded 
different results. For example, in New River Industries v. N.L.R.B. ,142 the 
Fourth Circuit considered a sarcastic letter written by several employees 
and posted on a bulletin board "thanking" management for free ice cream 
cones given to employees in celebration of a deal. Management was not 
amused by the letter, and employees who were involved in the writing, 
typing, and posting of the letter were fired. The Board held that the 
employer violated section 8(a)( l)  by firing employees who were engaged in 
protected concerted activity. The court denied enforcement of the Board 
order, holding that the letter was not intended to spur collective action to 
correct a working condition. 143 The court cited Jefferson Standard and 
136. Estlund, supra note 35, at 988-94 . 
137. NLRB v. Electrical Workers (IBEW) Loca1 1229, 346 U.S. 464 (1953). 
138. I d. at 476. 
139. Jd. at 476-77. 
140. Jd. at 477-78. 
141. ld. at 481 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For a recent case in which the ALJ and the Board 
concluded that the employee's public disparagement of the employer did not lose protection but the 
court of appeals concluded that it did, see St. Luke 's Episcopal-Presbyterian Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 268 
F.3d 575 (8th Cir. 2001) (nurse appeared on local news broadcast and accused hospital of "jeopardizing 
the health and safety of mothers and babies" by changing shift assignments and duties of nurses). 
142. 945 F.2d 1290 (4th Cir. 1991). 
143. Jd. at 1295. 
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explained that the criticism of management at issue was not related to 
mutual aid or protection of the employees .144 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit 
in Reef Industries, Inc. v. NLRB,145 dealt with a fact situation which it 
admitted was "almost identical"146 to that in New River Industries. 
Employees, who learned of a statement (taken out of context) by a manager 
in an unfair labor practice hearing about the level of education of plant 
employees, sent a sarcastic letter and tee shirt to the manager. The 
employee who made the tee shirt was terminated for insubordination. The 
Fifth Circuit enforced the Board's order, holding that the activities were not 
so offensive or harmful to the business as to lose protection, 147 that the 
activities related to an ongoing labor dispute, 148 and that the activities were 
adequately related to the employment relationship, even though they did not 
request or demand that the employer take a specific action regarding a term 
or condition of employment.149 On petition for rehearing, the employer 
argued that the Fifth Circuit was creating a circuit split by reaching a 
different result from that of the Fourth Circuit in New River Industries on 
indistinguishable facts. The Fifth Circuit rejected that argument, saying 
that the cases were "almost" factually identical, but the few factual 
differences were material. 150 
The criticism that the standard under which conduct becomes 
. unprotected is vague, first made by the dissent in Jefferson Standard, was 
more recently raised by Professor Sharpe.151 He proposed a standard under 
which concerted activity that is otherwise protected by section 7 loses 
protection only if the activity "unreasonably threatens the long-term 
viability . . . of the enterprise, the labor-management relationship, or the 
employment relationship."152 This standard appears more favorable to 
employees than the current capricious principles, and it arguably provides 
more information and predictability for all parties. 
144. The court thus actually held that the conduct at issue was not protected rather than that it lost 
protection. The court's citation of Jefferson Standard, in which the reviewing court considered both 
issues, further demonstrates the lack of a definitive standard: conduct can be treated either as 
unprotected in the first instance or as having lost protection because of insubordination, disobedience, or 
disloyalty. 
145. 952 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1991), reh 'g denied, 952 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1992). 
146. Id. at 840. 
1 47. Id. at 837-38. 
148. Id. at 838. 
149. Id. at 838-39. 
1 50. Id. at 840 ("Although the facts in New River Industries are 'almost' identical to those in the 
instant case, they are not identical-and in the word, almost, lies the significant distinction that eschews a 
conflict between this circuit and the Fourth."). For further comparison of Reef, Industries, Inc., and New 
River Industries, see Sharpe, supra note 26, at 239. 
1 5 1 .  Sharpe, supra note 26. 
1 52. Id. at 233. 
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4. The Three Requirements 
In view of the interpretations, criticisms, and proposals regarding the 
three elements of section 7 protected conduct, one can conclude that the 
criticisms are meritorious and that the more worker-friendly interpretations 
are more consistent with the intent of section 7. That does not mean, 
however, that the Board or the federal courts must accept those 
interpretations. 153 If the NLRA came to play a larger role in the body of 
employment law protecting nonunionized as well as unionized employees, 
the three elements and the interpretations given them would become even 
more important. 154 
IV. 
PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY OF NONUNION EMPLOYEES 
What can nonunionized employees get in the workplace from the 
section 7 right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection? 
The most obvious thing is voice, a means for nonunion employees to 
express their views and to obtain information regarding terms and 
conditions of employment and other aspects of the employment relationship 
and the business. 1 55 The second thing that employees might obtain through 
exercise of this section 7 right is power.156 Professor Harper argues that the 
most lamentable aspect of the decline of unions is not, as many say, 
employees' loss of voice through their representative, but instead their loss 
of the power to get a larger share of the pie and to protect themselves from 
"arbitrary, unjust, or discriminatory treatment by their managers."157 
Exercise of section 7 rights directly gives employees such voice. Power is a 
less direct result of the exercise of section 7 rights, and, even when 
mustered, it rarely, if ever, will reach the level in the nonunionized context 
that it does when there is a union and a collective bargaining agreement. 
Still, exercise of section 7 rights can give employees some power. While 
the section 7 right lacks the direct power of individual employment rights 
statutes, which require an employer to provide a certain thing or to refrain 
153. The Board, during most periods of time, has been more receptive of employee-friendly 
interpretations and standards and more protective of workers than have the federal courts of appeals. 
154. Professor Alan Hyde, after discussing the limitations on section 7 conduct, concluded that 
"[a]ll these subtle and treacherous limitations on section 7 have historically performed the function of 
reinforcing bureaucratic unionism, by eliminating the kinds of quick, spontaneous action that groups at 
low levels of organization (such as industrial unions in 1930's America) may undertake." Hyde, supra 
note 76, at 170-7 1 .  
155. See., e.g., Harper, supra note 24, at 1 10-15 (and sources cited therein). 
1 56. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 1 7 1  (discussing voice-input regarding terms and conditions of 
employment-and muscle-mechanism for enforcement of rights-as two essential ingredients of 
sound workplace policy). 
157. Harper, supra note 24, at 1 04. 
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from taking a particular employment action, section 7 gives employees the 
flexibility to decide what they want and protects them in undertaking their 
own concerted actions to persuade the employer to give them what they 
want. The employer is not required by law to give employees what they 
want, but the employer cannot fire the employees for acting in ways that 
cause the employer to do so. Moreover, the exercise of voice may cause 
employees to seek unions or other representative structures that will 
increase their power to obtain what they want. 
A number of Board and court decisions in the last few years on the 
issue of protected concerted activity suggest that section 7 is becoming an 
important law for nonunionized employees and that it could become even 
more important. This section discusses some of the decisions from the last 
three years. 158 The following decisions are selected to exemplify the scope 
of section 7 protection and the potential for protecting employees who are 
not represented by a union. 
A. Expression and Technology 
At its core, the NLRA is about communication and expression, which 
then give impetus for other action to improve the workers' lot. In an age of 
information technology, a law rooted in communication should not only fit 
in well, but flourish. Computers, e-mail, and the Internet make the NLRA 
more relevant in the twenty�first century than at any time since its passage. 
Employees can now exercise their section 7 rights by means of these new 
technologies. Lacking the level o:f:detail of some employment laws, section 
7 of the NLRA derives its relev�nce and power from its simplicity and 
flexibility.159 Commentators are now beginning to explore how the NLRA 
will fare in the age of information technology more generally, but most of 
the commentary at this time addresses the potential for unions to use 
technology for organizing. 160 
The most obvious thing that nonunion employees can do under Section 
7 is express or communicate their views (often read as "complain") about 
terms and conditions or other aspects of the employment relationship. 16 1 
1 58. For a good compilation of cases involving nonunionized employees claiming to exercise 
section 7 rights, see Melissa K. Stull, Annotation, Spontaneous or Informal Activities of Employees as 
"Concerted Activities, " Within Meaning of§ 7 of National Labor Relations Act (29 USCS § 15 7), 1 07 
ALR FED. 245 ( 1992 & Supp. 2000). 
1 59. Frederick D. Rapone, Jr., This Is Not Your Grandfather's Labor Union-Or Is It? Exercising 
Section 7 Rights in the Cyberspace Age, 39 DUQ. L. REv. 657, 658 (2001)  ("The beauty of the Act lies 
in its simple language and clear purpose."). 
1 60. See id.; Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in 
Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2000); Gwynne A. 
Wilcox, Section 7 Rights of Employees and Union Access to Employees: Cyber Organizing, 1 6  LAB. 
LAW. 253 (200 1).  
1 6 1.  See Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L. J. 10 1 ,  
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This protected right to express views takes on added significance with 
advances in technology, which have simplified dissemination of 
information on a broad scale. Employees can use new technologies to 
express their views about their jobs and to attempt to rouse support for their 
views and for collective action. 162 However, technology has also made it 
possible for employers to monitor employee communications pervasively 
and clandestinely and has created some incentives for employers to monitor 
and/or investigate how employees are using new technology. 
Consider the case of the "wise guy" using the company e-mail in 
Timekeeping Systems, Inc. 163 The employee, Leinweber, was a software 
engineer who prepared computer programs at a company that manufactured 
data collection products. The company's chief officer sent a message to all 
employees via the company's e-mail system in which he described a 
proposed new vacation policy which he said would give employees more 
days off each year than the current plan. The e-mail message invited 
employees to respond to the proposal: "Your comments are welcome, but 
not required." 164 One employee took the message at face value and 
responded, "GREAT!" Leinweber, on the other hand, offered comments of 
a different tenor, sending an e-mail message to all employees in which he 
demonstrated that the boss ' s  assertion that the proposed plan would result in 
more days off each year was wrong. Moreover, Leinweiber wrote with, 
shall we say, an attitude. He began by saying that he would prove the 
boss's statement to be false, and he concluded by saying that he had proven 
it to be false. The employee who had first responded favorably, sent a 
follow-up message in which he concluded "Not so Great." A record­
breaking volume of responses was generated. 
The boss was not too pleased with Leinweber's response, and he sent a 
memorandum (no more e-mails for the boss) to him saying that he was very 
disappointed with him for the "inappropriate and intentionally provocative" 
message. The memorandum further said that Leinweber's e-mail message 
ran afoul of the company employment manual provision stating that 
"[f]ailure to treat others with courtesy and respect" could result in 
immediate dismissal. Still, the boss wanted to be merciful, and his 
memorandum instructed that Leinweber could save his job if he composed 
an e-mail message explaining why he did a bad thing, submitting a draft of 
1 18-19 (1 995) ("The NLRA is rarely used by and is largely unfamiliar to nonunion employees outside 
the organizing context. But section 7 is a potentially significant source of free speech rights in the 
workplace on issues of concern to workers; it protects speech about unionization or other forms of 
employee representation, discussion of work-related grievances, and petitioning for their redress."). 
162. See Hyde, supra note 76, at 149 ("Employee representation through caucuses is most 
developed among higher-educated employees in high technology workplaces who communicate through 
computer networks."). 
163. 323 N.L.R.B. 244 ( 1 997). The case involved a nonunion setting. 
164. !d. at 246. 
2002 WAITING FOR THE LABOR LA W OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 289 
that message to the boss for approval, and thereafter, posting the approved 
message by e-mail to those who had received Leinweber's inappropriate 
message. Leinweber proved unable to grovel well, after staying up late into 
the morning trying to compose something. His discharge letter gave two 
reasons for termination: "[f]ailure to treat others with courtesy and respect" 
and "[f]ailure to follow instructions or to perform assigned work."165 
So what was Leinweber to do? Did he have a legal cause of action? 
Imagine Leinweber walks into an attorney's office and tells his story. His 
conclusion is that he was unfairly terminated because he sarcastically 
communicated his opposition to his employer's proposal regarding a term 
of employment, and he was terminated because his expression was sarcastic 
or rude, and when his employer gave him the ultimatum to apologize and 
grovel or else, he chose or else. The attorney agrees that it is a sad story but 
can think of no individual employment rights statute that applies. What law 
says you can sass your boss? So, Leinweber suffers the misfortune, noting 
that life is sometimes unfair, and finds another job? Well, not so fast. He 
files an unfair labor practice charge with the regional office of the NLRB 
alleging a violation of section 8(a)( l) of the NLRA for discharge because he 
engaged in protected, concerted activity. 
The rest of the story is that Leinweber won, and the remedy ordered by 
the administrative law judge and affirmed by the Board ordered the 
employer to offer Leinweber reinstatement with all of the benefits he had 
and to make him whole for any losses he suffered. 166 
Leinweber's conduct fell within the purview of section 7, even though 
two of the required elements caused some concern. "For mutual aid or 
protection" clearly was satisfied, as the employee was discussing a 
proposed vacation plan, a term of employment. Under concerted, the ALJ 
concluded that Leinweber's conduct satisfied the Meyers II standard 
because his e-mail message was intended to "incite" other employees to 
help him keep the old vacation policy.167 The ALJ also found that the 
employer knew of the concerted nature of Leinweber's conduct; indeed, it 
was the fact that the sarcastic message was sent to other employees that 
most angered the boss. The judge recognized that "[s]ome concerted 
conduct can be expressed in so intolerable a manner as to lose the 
protection of Section 7. "168 Although the ALJ found Leinweber to be "a 
rather unusual person . . .  [and] a bit of a wise guy,"169 the conduct was not 
so violent or serious to render him unfit for service. 170 
1 65. Jd. at 247. 
1 66. Jd. at 245. 
167. I d. at 248. 
1 68. I d. 
1 69. Jd. at 250. 
1 70. Jd. at 248. The ALJ considered the sarcastic tone of the e-mail in Timekeeping Systems Jess 
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Timekeeping Systems is an important recent Board decision 
demonstrating the potential of section 7 protection in the nonunion 
workplace. One employee expressed his views via "new" technology to his 
employer and his co-employees about a term of employment. He expressed 
his views in a disrespectful manner, and his response appears to have 
started a groundswell of support for retaining the existing policy. 
The Board and courts will have to resolve another issue regarding 
section 7 and technology: whether it is an unfair labor practice for an 
employer to monitor communications among employees regarding matters 
for mutual aid or protection. Employers have recently responded to 
advances in technology by rampant monitoring of employees in the 
workplace. 1 7 1  The technology provides both new methods of monitoring 
and new reasons for monitoring employees, who may use the technology to 
disseminate information that may cost the business money. 1 72 Congress has 
not yet . passed legislation restricting monitoring of employees, despite 
introduction of proposed legislation regarding this issue, 1 73 and states also 
have been reluctant to enact such laws. 174 The tort theory of invasion of 
privacy has not provided much protection because one element of the tort is 
an expectation of privacy, and employers can easily undermine the 
employee's privacy expectation by stating in its policies that the employer 
reserves the right to monitor and search e-mails and computer files. The 
best protection currently available for communications about terms and 
offensive than the protected statement of an employee in another case that the CEO was a "cheap son of 
a bitch." Jd. (citing Groves Truck & Trailer, 281 N.L.R.B. 1 1 94, 1 1 95 (1986). 
1 71 .  See generally AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, WORKPLACE MONITORING & 
SURVEILLANCE: POLICIES AND PRACTICES (2000) (report examining the policies, practices, and 
motivations regarding computer monitoring by 435 employers); Workers Are Losing Their Privacy at 
Work, According to fLO Study, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 146 (Aug. 2, 1 994) (study by International 
Labour Organization indicated that, among industrialized nations, American workers are most 
susceptible to monitoring by their employers). 
1 72. For example, employers are concerned that employees may use e-mail or the Internet to send 
trade secrets to competitors. A second concern is that employees may send material to co-employees or 
others that may result in the employer being held liable for sexual harassment, some other type of 
harassment, or various torts, including defamation and invasion of privacy. See Attorneys Say 
Employees ' Use of E-Mail Creating Possible Legal Pitfalls for Employers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 
130, at C-1 (July 6, 2000); see also AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, supra note 171 (survey of 
employers indicating that potential legal liability is a principal reason that they monitor employees' 
computer use). 
1 73. The Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, 1 07th Cong., (2000), would have limited 
the circumstances under which employers could electronically monitor employees. See Business 
Coalition Blocks Markup of Bill Requiring Electronic Monitoring Notification, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 180, at A-9 (Sept. 15, 2000). A similar bill, the Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act (H.R. 
1900) was introduced in Congress in 1993, and after some early success in subcommittees, it bogged 
down in Congress. See House Education, Labor Subpanel Approves Measure to Curtail Electronic 
Monitoring, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at D-14 (Feb. 24, 1994). 
1 74. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing California governor's veto of such 
legislation). 
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conditions of employment may be section 7 of the NLRA. This is a privacy 
protection limited to a particular type of communication--communication 
for mutual aid or protection-but it could be important. 
B. Rules Established by Employers 
Employees can also challenge rules established by employers, arguing 
that the rules restrict conduct protected under section 7. In some of the 
cases, the employers argue that they established the prohibitory rules in an 
attempt to avoid liability under some other law, such as sexual harassment 
under Title VII or discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act. I7s 
The Board's standard for analyzing whether maintenance of workplace 
rules violates section 8(a)( l)  was established in Lafayette Park Hotel. 176 
The Board held that: 
[T]he appropriate inquiry is whether the rules would reasonably tend to chill 
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Where the rules are 
likely to have a chilling effect on Section 7 rights, the Board may conclude 
that their maintenance is an unfair labor practice, even absent evidence of 
enforcement. 177 
In Compuware Corp. v. NLRB,178 the state had awarded a contract to 
Peat Marwick to upgrade the state 's  computers. Peat Marwick then 
contracted with Compuware to provide support personnel to train the state 's  
employees. Plaintiff was one of the Compuware employees. Plaintiff 
discussed with co-employees and supervisors his dissatisfaction with 
several of Compuware's  employment practices, including long hours, 
stress, and last-minute changes to training materials. When he discussed 
these concerns with the master trainer and got no satisfaction, he threatened 
to bring the concerns up at a meeting at which a representative of the state 
would be present. When this threat was relayed to a Peat Marwick 
supervisor, the supervisor requested that Compuware remove plaintiff from 
the project. Compuware terminated plaintiff, a temporary employee hired 
for the particular job. At the beginning of the job, all employees were told 
that Peat Marwick had a rule that prohibited subcontractors from directly 
approaching the client without authorization from Peat Marwick. 
The employer argued that none of the elements of section 7 protected 
activity were satisfied. First, it argued that the plaintiff employee's conduct 
was not concerted because he acted alone and that he was not specifically 
1 75. See, e.g., Lockheed Aeronautics, 330 N.L.R.B. 422 (2000), discussed infra notes 187-1 88 and 
accompanying text. 
1 76. 326 N.L.R.B. 824 (1998), enforced, 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1 999). 
1 77. /d. at 825 (footnote omitted). 
1 78. 1 34 F.3d 1 285 (6th Cir.), enforcing 320 N.L.R.B. 101, cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1 123 ( 1 998). 
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authorized by any co-workers to represent them. Two co-workers testified 
at the hearing that they had not authorized the plaintiff to represent them 
before management. The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, explaining 
that specific authorization is not needed to establish concerted activity; 
rather, the question is "whether the employee acted with the purpose of 
furthering group goals."179 
Second, the employer argued that rules that discourage exercise of 
section 7 rights are permissible when the rules protect important employer 
interests. The court rejected this argument because the rule facially did not 
strike any balance between the employees' section 7 rights and Peat 
Marwick' s business interest. The court agreed with the Board that the 
employer could not "institute a work rule that restricts employees' ability to 
engage m concerted activity by prohibiting communication with third 
parties. " 180 
Third, the employer argued that the conduct did not come under 
section 7 because there was no ongoing labor dispute, since management 
was on the workers ' side and was trying to address the workers' concerns. 
This essentially was an argument that the conduct was not for mutual aid or 
protection. The court gave that argument short shrift, holding that the 
employees were involved in a dispute over working conditions.181 
Finally, the employer argued that the plaintiffs threat to go to a third 
party, even if concerted and for mutual aid or protection, lost protection 
because it was disloyal to the employer. Again, the court agreed with the 
Board that an employer cannot make a rule or acquiesce in another 
employer' s rule that prohibits the concerted activity of communications 
with third parties. Such communications do not lose protection unless they 
are very disloyal or maliciously false. The communications that the 
p laintiff threatened to make were about working conditions and were 
neither false nor disloyal and thus were not divested of section 7 
protection. 182 
179. !d. at 1287. The following evidence established the concerted nature of the plaintiff's activity: 
plaintiff had discussed his concerns about working conditions with the other trainers from the beginning 
of his employment; he had arranged a lunch meeting between trainers and managers to discuss 
grievances, which the employees attended; in his discussion with the master trainer, the plaintiff said he 
was going to the meeting with the state representative to speak for all of the employees; the plaintiff 
made it known to his manager and co-workers alike that he had organized a union at a previous job and 
that he had a labor relations degree; and some of the trainers had commented that, since the plaintiff had 
been a union steward, he should be the one to talk to management. !d. at 1290. 
1 80. !d. at 1290. Employers may have even greater concerns about employee communications with 
third parties than they have regarding internal communications because such external communications 
may do greater damage, such as causing loss of a customer. Nonetheless, the Board has held such 
communications are protected under section 7 if they are not disloyal or maliciously false. !d. at 1291 . 
1 8 1 .  /d. 
182. !d. at 1291 .  
2002 WAITING FOR THE LABOR LA W OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 293 
In NLRB v. Main Street Terrace Care Center, 183 the Sixth Circuit 
enforced the Board's order holding that an employer's rule that prohibited 
employees from discussing their wages with other employees constituted a 
violation of section 8(a)( l ). The court held that such a rule "undoubtedly 
tends to interfere with the employees' right to engage in protected concerted 
activity."184 The employer attempted to avoid a violation by arguing that 
the rule was not written, that it was not promulgated by a person who had 
rulemaking authority, and that it was not enforced. The court rejected the 
argument that there was no rule because it was not written, reasoning that 
such an approach would enable employers to do with an orally 
communicated rule what is prohibited when done by a written rule. 185 
Regarding authority to promulgate the rule, the court held that the person 
who made the rule was a supervisor, thus making the employer responsible 
for the rule. Finally, the court rejected the argument that the rule was not an 
unfair labor practice because it was not enforced. The court responded that 
even absent enforcement, the rule nonetheless would have a chilling effect 
on the employees' exercise of their section 7 rights. The Court also agreed 
with the Board' s  conclusion that, although the employee who presented the 
wage-related complaints to management often did so alone, she always 
acted as the representative of at least one other employee. Therefore, her 
activity was concerted. 186 
Another recent case involving an employer rule and section 7 activity 
is Lockheed Aeronautics. 187 Though the case involved employees 
represented by a union, this was not a factor in the fmding of an unfair labor 
practice. Guards at Lockheed became dissatisfied with work 
accommodations that were granted to a co-employee because of her medical 
limitations. When the employee discovered that her co-workers were 
discussing her physical limitations, she filed an internal complaint, alleging 
a hostile environment. Concerned with potential liability under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, the company warned employees not to 
discuss the matter and also warned them not to discuss disciplinary 
investigations or discipline decisions. The Board acknowledged that the 
employer had legal obligations that might justify some restrictions. 
However, the restrictions imposed by this employer were not narrowly 
tailored to its legitimate interests and to avoid unnecessary interference with 
the employees' exercise of their section 7 rights.188 
1 83.  2 18  F.3d 53 1 (6th Cir. 2000), enforcing 327 N.L.R.B. 522. 
184. !d. at 537. 
1 85. !d. at 538. 
1 86. !d. at 539-40. 
1 87. 330 N.L.R.B. 422 (2000). 
188. Jd. at 423. 
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In Adtranz, ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation, N.A.,  Jnc. , 1 89 an 
employer rule restricted speech. Though the case involved the 
commencement of a union organizing campaign, the principle regarding the 
interaction of employer rules and section 7 protection would be equally 
applicable to a nonunion workplace. In Adtranz, the employer had a rule in 
an employee handbook that classified as "serious misconduct," subject to 
suspension without pay for a first violation and termination for a second, 
"using abusive or threatening language to anyone on company premises."190 
The ALJ, affirmed by the Board, held that, because abusive language was 
not defined, it could be interpreted as barring union organizing (or other 
protected section 7) expression. Thus, the ALJ and Board found an 8(a)(l )  
unfair labor practice. The D.C. Circuit was less receptive of the argument 
that the rule unnecessarily interfered with section 7 rights, labeling the 
position "simply preposterous."191  The court went on to say that "[i]t defies 
explanation that a law enacted to facilitate collective bargaining and protect 
employees' right to organize prohibits employers from seeking to maintain 
civility in the workplace."192 
The foregoing cases demonstrate that employer rules restricting 
conduct and communication by and among employees can violate section 7. 
Many of the cases involving challenges of employer rules have occurred in 
unionized workplaces, but several cases have arisen in non-unionized 
workplaces. Employers have resorted to rules in recent years to attempt to 
avoid liability for sexual harassment, disability discrimination, defamation, 
1 89. 331  N.L.R.B No. 40, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 334 (May 3 1 ,  2000), enforcement denied, 253 
F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 200 1). 
1 90. 2000 N.L.R.B. at * 1 2. 
1 9 1 .  253 F.3d at 28. 
192. !d. The Board recently discussed the D. C. Circuit's decision in Adtranz in Community Hosp. 
of Central Calif., 335 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 2001 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 770 (September 26, 2001). The Board 
considered a handbook provision that prohibited "[i]nsubordination, refusing to follow directions, obey 
legitimate requests or orders, or other disrespectful conduct towards a service integrator, service 
coordinator, or other individual." The Board held that maintenance of that rule was an 8(a)(l )  violation 
under the standard in Lafayette Park Hotel. After discussing the court's decision in Adtranz, the Board 
distinguished the rule in the case before it by saying that the rule was clearly broader and "significantly 
more likely to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights than the rule at issue in Adtranz. " 
2001 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 770 at * 1 8 . 
A case similar to Adtranz, ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation, N.A., Inc., but with the court 
reaching a different result, is Consolidated Coal Co. v. NLRB, 168 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2026 (4th Cir. 
2001). That case involved union organizing, but the principles regarding enforcement of a rule in 
derogation of section 7 rights would apply in a nonunion context. The employer had a harassment 
policy which stated that '"[a]ny unwelcome action, intended or not, which is considered offensive may 
be labeled harassment . . . . "' Employees distributing literature as part of a union organizing campaign 
had harassment complaints filed against them, they were investigated and, after official committee 
hearings on the charges, had documentation placed in their files that no action was taken on harassment 
charges. The court held that when employees are engaged in protected activity under section 7, an 
employer may not subject them to "coercive proceedings" on the basis of subjective allegations of 
harassment. 
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and other causes of action. Regardless of the reason for which a prohibitory 
rule is adopted, it may violate section 7.  
C. Speaking Out Against Employers 
Some cases find whistleblowing to be a specific type of expression 
protected by section 7 .  While whistle blowing is also protected by 
numerous federal and state statutes, these statutes often protect only a 
certain type, such as environmental whistleblowing. 193 Certain statutes194 
and the tort theory of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy195 
provide more general protection in most states. Section 7 can supplement 
such protections already in place and fill some gaps. 
Consider the Board's decision in Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Co. 196 In that case, insurance agents, not represented by a union, 
reported to the state insurance commissioner that their supervisor had 
knowingly mishandled claims. The employer retaliated, eventually leading 
to the alleged constructive discharge of the reporting agents. The employer 
argued that the agents ' reporting of the supervisor's conduct was not 
protected under section 7 because it did not bear any relationship to their 
working conditions; 197 accordingly, the employer argued that the concerted 
conduct was not for mutual aid or protection. The Board rejected this 
argument because the agents knew that failure to report insurance fraud was 
a violation of the company's policy and a violation of state law. The agents 
feared that if they did not report the conduct, they could be terminated, 
suffer other losses in wages and terms and conditions of employment, and 
lose clients if they were considered part of the fraud. 198 The Board thus 
reasoned that the agents reported their supervisor's conduct because of their 
concerns that a failure to do so might affect their terms and conditions of 
employment. 199 
193. See, e.g. , LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027 (West 2000). 
194. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:967(A)(1)- (2) (West 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-
150! (3)(c)(ii) (2000). 
195. Whistleblowing is one of the four types or categories of wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy tort theory. See generally MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8. 1 1  (2d 
ed. 1 999) (stating that three-quarters of states have whistleblower statutes, but others permit wrongful 
discharge tort claims). 
1 96. 333 N . L.R.B. No. 100, Case Nos. 10-CA-3 1 631 -1, 1 0-CA-3 1631-2, 2001 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 
2 1 1  (Apr. 5, 2001). 
197. 2001 N .L.R.B. LEXIS 2 1 1  at *3. 
1 98. !d. at *4-5. 
1 99. !d. at *5 (citing Brown & Root, Inc. v. NLRB, 634 F.2d 8 1 6, 8 1 8  (5th Cir. 1981)). The 
Board's explanation that the actions of the agents benefited the employees' own employment and 
economic interests, rather than the public, i llustrates Professor Estlund's point that the Board has given 
"mutual aid or protection" a narrow, self-centered interpretation, rather than interpreting it more broadly 
so that a public interest reason would satisfy it. See Estlund, supra note 35, at 967-970. 
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Employees who publicly criticize their employers for conduct that is 
not necessarily illegal and then suffer retaliation by the employer do not 
have an applicable statutory or common law theory of recovery in most 
states.200 Section 7 may provide a remedy. In Allstate Ins. Co. ,201 an 
employee who was operating under the company's  "neighborhood office 
agent" arrangement found that she had contributed $200,000 of her own 
money to the business over the years and had obtained only debts in return. 
She and other employees in the "NOA" program were interviewed for an 
article published in Fortune magazine, entitled Stalked by Allstate, in which 
plaintiff and others were critical of the program. After the article was 
published, the employer issued a "job-in-jeopardy" disciplinary warning to 
her. She filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging a violation of section 
8(a)(l ). The Board concluded that the employee's  conduct was concerted 
because she was "initiating or inducing group action" with the objective, in 
part, to alert others in the NOA program to the problems she had 
encountered.202 The Board concluded that the disciplinary letter was an 
infringement on the employee's exercise of her section 7 rights and thus 
was a violation of section 8(a)(l ) . 
In Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center,203 the hospital decided to out­
source its transcription department. The three transcriptionists took their 
appeal to staff doctors by writing them a letter on hospital stationery in 
which they apprized doctors of the hospital 's decision and asked the doctors 
to voice their opinions in favor of preserving the in-house department to the 
hospital administration. The Board found that the conduct of speaking out 
against the employer was a self-interested appeal to others to prevent job 
loss, and thus protected activity under section 7.  Furthermore, the employer 
did not prove that it would have fired the employees for the use of hospital 
stationery in the absence of the protected concerted activity. Therefore, the 
terminations violated section 8(a)(l) .  
Whistleblowing is a type of employee communication that has often 
resulted in employers taking adverse actions. While there are state and 
federal statutes that provide protection for some forms of whistleblowing, 
section 7 can play a valuable role in the interstices between these laws. 
More generally, the foregoing cases demonstrate that employees who suffer 
adverse consequences after speaking out against their employers may have 
recourse under section 7. 
200. See, e.g., Marsh v. Delta Airlines, 952 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1997) (employee of airline 
who wrote letter to newspaper that was critical of his employer and was terminated could not recover 
under either state wrongful discharge statute or covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 
201 .  335 N.L.R.B. No. 83, Case No. 3-CA-2 1350, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 727 (Sept. 29, 2000). 
202. 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 727 at *6 n.3. 
203. 332 N.L.R.B. No. 153, Case Nos. 21 -CA-331 10, 21 -CA-33 152, 2000 N.L.R.B. 915 (2000). 
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D. Work Stoppages 
One of the most traditional types of concerted activity in unionized 
workplaces is a work stoppage. Protected work stoppages can also occur in 
nonunion settings. In Vencare Ancillary Services, Inc. ,204 physical 
therapists were advised of wage cuts. They voiced their protests to a 
supervisor and gave him a memorandum in which they objected to 
implementation of the wage cuts. When the employees met with a 
supervisor and presented the memorandum to him, one of them said that 
they had no union and no representative to voice their concerns for them, 
but they felt very strongly about the wage cuts. When management did not 
promptly respond, the physical therapists refused to see patients in protest. 
They were discharged for their actions. The Board found an 8(a)( l )  unfair 
labor practice because the physical therapists were engaged in a short-term 
work stoppage that was protected under section 7. 205 
v. 
CHANGES TO FACILITATE REINVIGORATION 
Nonunionized employees have found recourse in the NLRA. How can 
more employees avail themselves of the rights and protections that the Act 
gives them? One prerequisite is that employees and employers become 
better informed that section 7 rights apply to employees not represented by 
unions. Section 7 rights have very little significance if employees are 
unaware that they exist.206 A second requisite is that the Board207 and the 
federal courts of appeals give increased recognition to the section 7 rights of 
nonunion employees. 
A. Advising Nonunion Employees of Their NLRA Rights 
1. Requirement ofNotice Posting Regarding Section 7 Rights 
The most obvious step toward making the NLRA a major source of 
204. 334 N.L.R.B. No. 1 19, Case No. 28-CA-26096-2, 2001 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 574 (Aug. 6, 2001). 
205. The Board rejected the employer's argument that the five employees constituted a statutory 
"labor organization" which violated section 8(g) by not giving ten days advance notice of the work 
stoppage. The Board also rejected arguments that the work stoppage was an unprotected partial strike 
and that it lost protection because it was too disruptive of patient care. 2001 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 74 at * 1 9. 
206. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 76, at 167 ("[W]hile section 7 protects group action in the 
nonunion workplace, the hypertechnical nature of its boundaries provides shaky protection for 
employees who take spontaneous action in pressurized situations without assistance from any formal 
organization.") 
207. I use "Board" to mean all of the procedural infrastructure of the NLRB, including the regional 
offices and the administrative law judges who hear unfair labor practice cases. 
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protection for nonunion employees is for employers and employees to 
become informed of employees' rights. The rights and protections of 
nonunion employees under the NLRA are perhaps the best-kept secret in 
labor law. Employees and employers could become better informed of 
nonunion employees' rights through a requirement of notice posting by 
employers. This is an obvious and unoriginal recommendation, but it is 
fundamental,208 and it has become more important in light of the cases 
involving unfair labor practice claims by nonunion workers and the Board's 
decision in Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio.209 
Labor law scholars have recommended that the NLRB adopt a rule 
requiring that employers post notices prepared under the auspices of the 
Board in conspicuous places in the workplace.210 Professor Morris filed a 
petition with the Board, joined by Professor Samuel Estreicher, requesting 
that it issue a rule requiring such a posting.21 1 It is interesting that most of 
the federal individual employment rights statutes have notice posting 
requirements,212 but the NLRA, the oldest federal labor law and the 
cornerstone, does not. I agree with Professor DeChiara that what is needed 
is a Board rule, either by adjudication or by use of the Board's rulemaking 
authority,213 requiring notice posting, which should state the rights involved 
and give examples.214 Epilepsy Foundation provides a good opportunity to 
do this because it is a major change in the law that can be stated as a 
concrete rule. But, if the Board requires covered employers to post a notice 
regarding the Epilepsy Foundation right, there is no need to limit the notice 
to statement and explanation of the Weingarten right. Rather, the notice 
should go on to explain the other section 7 rights applicable to nonunion as 
well as union employees. 
208. DeChiara, supra note 35, at 438 ("Ignorance of the law disempowers people. It prevents them 
from seeking redress for legal wrongs, and also causes them to shy away from taking actions to which 
they are legally entitled."). 
209. See Heldman, supra note 30, at 220 ("Should the employer be required-as a matter of case 
adjudication or as a matter of rulemaking-to notify employees of their right under Epilepsy 
Foundation?"); see also Management, Union Reactions, supra note 3 1  (quoting AFL-CIO Associate 
General Counsel Nancy Schiffer saying that a notice posting requirement would help to educate 
employers and employees). 
2 1 0. Charles J. Morris, Renaissance at the NLRB-Opportunity and Prospect for Nonlegislative 
Reform at the Labor Board, 23 STETSON L. REV. 101 ,  1 1 0- 12 (1983) [hereinafter Morris, Renaissance]; 
DeChiara, supra note 35. 
2 1 1 . See Morris, Renaissance, supra note 210, at 1 10-12. 
2 12. DiChiara, supra note 35, at 440-43 (discussing notice posting requirements under ERISA, the 
federal employment discrimination statutes, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, and the Employee Polygraph Protection Act). 
213 .  29 U.S.C. § 153(b)(6) (2002) ("The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, 
amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act."). 
2 14. DeChiara, supra note 35, at 459. 
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2. Organized Labor Assuming the Mission of Advising Nonunion 
Employees of Their NLRA Rights 
The other way of ensuring that employees and employers know of the 
nonunion workers' section 7 rights is for someone to undertake an 
aggressive campaign to inform them. The obvious candidate for this 
educator is organized labor. Unions should undertake this mission as a 
service to workers. While it may seem ironic for unions to tell employees 
that they have rights and protections under the NLRA without unions, there 
are good reasons for unions to advise nonunion employees of their rights. 
Organized labor, although often portrayed as being more concerned with its 
self-preservation than with workers' well-being,215 often has acted in the 
best interest of workers, even when it was not clear that the actions would 
help organized labor. Consider, for example, organized labor's support for 
individual employment rights laws,216 even though those laws may have 
decreased the perceived need for unionization. 
Leading labor law scholars have outlined a new role for unions in the 
individual employment rights regime of advising nonunion workers of their 
individual employment rights and assisting them in enforcing those 
rights.217 Unions might perform these services out of a sense of duty or out 
of self-interest in developing a future relationship.218 Those motivations 
should be even stronger when the rights are those protected in the NLRA, 
which has been the traditional focus of organized labor. Unions might find 
that this service would raise awareness of the NLRA and perhaps of the 
value of having a labor organization as a representative. Employees who 
exercise their section 7 rights without a representative will find that they 
have voice. However, to muster adequate power to obtain the workplace 
conditions that they want and to protect their rights may require that they be 
represented by a union. Thus, unions could view education about section 7 
rights and their exercise by nonunion employees as .the first experiments 
with organization by employees, some leading to unionization and others 
not.219 As Professor Summers has written, unions' solicitude for the rights 
215. See, e.g., Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor 's Identity Crisis, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1 767, 
1821 (200 1) ("To sway public opinion and to move workers to risk joining unions, labor must transcend 
its image of economic self-interest and protectionism."). 
2 1 6. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 20, at 168-69 (discussing important role of organized labor in 
securing passage of federal employment discrimination laws). 
2 1 7. Clyde Summers, Unions Without Majority-A Black Hole, 66 CHI-KENT L. REV. 5 3 1 ,  542-45 
( 1990) [hereinafter Summers, Unions Without Majority]; Rabin, supra note 1 9, at 204-13;  cf Gould, 
supra note 50, at 755 ("My National Labor Relations Board took account of the need of unions to 
involve themselves in the wide array of new regulatory legislation that has become such a prominent 
part of the landscape during this past quarter century.") 
2 1 8. Rabin, supra note 1 9, at 208; Summers, Unions Without Majority, supra note 2 1 7, at 548. 
2 1 9. See Morris, supra note 2, at 1 753 ("Such activity often begins with only an elementary 
expression of mutual aid or protection among a very few employees . . .  employees begin to know that 
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of employees, even outside the majority union, exclusive representative 
role, "can be the most persuasive path to achieving majority status. "220 
The opportunity to embark on a campaign of informing nonunion 
employees and employers of the employees' section 7 rights is an 
opportunity for organized labor to perform a valuable service in 
unorganized workplaces, to improve its image with employees who may 
have negative views of unions, and to sow the seeds for representation 
prospects. While the mission may seem unconventional to organized labor, 
it is part of developing a new, holistic view of labor law in which the 
NLRA is part of the picture for both organized and unorganized 
workplaces. This new vision could reinvigorate both the NLRA and 
organized labor. 
B. The Board and the Courts-A New Perspective 
The vast maj ority of cases in which employees file unfair labor 
practice charges for violation of their section 7 rights have involved 
employees represented by unions or involved in organizational activity. In 
such cases, the Board and the courts have considerable experience and have 
developed a wealth of case law regarding whether conduct is concerted and 
"for mutual aid or protection."221 The Board certainly has experience with 
section 7 activity by nonunion employees, but those cases have not been the 
Board's bread-and-butter. The federal courts of appeals have even less 
experience and are less comfortable with finding nonunion employees' 
conduct protected under the NLRA. 
If a broader vision of the NLRA as a major source of workplace law 
protecting nonunion employees is to emerge, the NLRB must take the 
initiative. The Board is the agency charged with interpretation and 
enforcement of the NLRA. Procedurally, the regional offices of the Board 
must be receptive of unfair labor practice charges by nonunion employees 
and aggressive in investigating and issuing complaints.222 Substantively, 
they have the right to organize, that they have the right to develop a sense of organization, and that they 
can experience organization through trial and error . . .  "). 
220. Summers, Unions Without Majority, supra note 2 1 7, at 548. 
221 .  For example, the Interboro doctrine provides a way of satisfYing the concertedness 
requirement when there is a collective bargaining agreement, but not in the nonunion context. Interboro 
Contractors, 1 57 N.L.R.B. 1295 ( 1 966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967). Under that doctrine, an 
individual employee's "invocation" of a right rooted in the collective bargaining agreement is concerted 
activity. See, e.g., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 20, at 1 38-39. 
222. Writing in 1992, Professor Estlund suggested that few cases that do not involve union 
organizing or employees represented by unions or a direct connection to terms and conditions of 
employment are likely to proceed to the stage of the General Counsel's filing a complaint alleging an 
unfair labor practice. See Estlund, supra note 35, at 939-40 n.93. Estlund also noted that an informal 
survey of the regional offices of the NLRB showed that "few calls of this nature come in and that such 
calls are simply turned away in the absence of a link to unionization or terms and conditions of 
employment." /d. 
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the Board should consider more liberal interpretations of the three 
requirements for protected conduct, as discussed above.223 Also, the Board 
must make the case to the courts that a broader vision of the NLRA is both 
needed and appropriate to protect employees. 
It is not clear that the courts of appeals would be receptive of a broad 
application of the NLRA to nonunion employees, including more liberal 
interpretations of the three coverage requirements. They are likely to see 
such a development as the Board's attempt to expand its jurisdiction. The 
courts have not generally accorded much deference to the Board in its 
interpretation of the NLRA.224 This also has been true for some circuit 
cases dealing with the Board's determination of protected conduct by 
nonunion employees.225 For the courts to accept expansive interpretations 
and applications of the NLRA, they must accept a new vision of the law of 
the workplace in which the NLRA plays a larger role and is seen as 
obviating the need for more litigation based on individual employment 
rights laws. If this new vision is difficult for the courts to develop, it will 
take a message from the Supreme Court or Congress to sharpen the visual 
acuity. 
VI. 
POSSIBLE RESULTS OF A REINVIGORATED NLRA 
IN NONUNION WORKPLACES 
A. Organization and Representation 
Unrepresented employees who exercise section 7 rights might find 
that, although section 7 rights give them a voice to express their complaints 
and desires, they do not give them much power with which to obtain what 
they want from their employers. Because of the concertedness requirement, 
most employees invoking section 7 will have enlisted the input or support 
of at least one co-worker. From there, it is not a large step to pursue more 
formal organization and representation to marshal more power. 
223. Cf Hyde, supra note 76, at 1 7 1  ("If labor law does undertake seriously to protect the infonnal 
network or caucus as a basic institution of labor law, many of these interpretations of section 7 will have 
to be loosened up to give breathing space to unorganized employees."). 
224. See, e.g., NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001) (rejecting the 
Board's test for detennining whether registered nurses are supervisors); see also Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 122 S.Ct. 1275 (2002) (rejecting Board's award of backpay to 
undocumented alien who was discriminatorily fired). 
225. See, e.g., ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation, N..A., Inc., 33 1 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (May 31 ,  
2000), enforcement denied, 253  F.3d 19  (D.C. Cir. 2001); Aroostook County Reg'! Ophthalmology Ctr. 
v. NLRB, 8 1  F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1996), enforcing in part and denying enforcement in part, 3 1 7  
N.L.R.B. 2 1 8 .  
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J .  A Newfound Need for Unions 
This article suggests that organized labor can and should undertake the 
mission of advising nonunion employees of their rights under the NLRA. 226 
If unions did so, they would provide a valuable service to these workers, 
often dispelling negative perceptions of unions, and they would make 
known their availability to serve as collective bargaining representatives if 
the employees chose to organize. Employees exercising their section 7 
rights might find themselves overmatched when employers resist their 
complaints and demands. To increase their power to obtain what they want 
and to secure better preparation and representation in unfair labor practice 
proceedings, many employees might tum to the unions that educated them 
regarding their rights in the first instance. 
2. New Forms of Employee Organization and Representation 
Professor Alan Hyde has described an emerging new model of worker 
organization and representation based on the section 7 rights of nonunion 
employees, in which employees organize themselves into voluntary, 
informal caucuses around common causes. 227 He has described these 
caucuses as having the following characteristics: 1 )  they arise in nonunion 
workplaces; 2) they are not experienced by the participants as unions; and 
3) they raise demands that unions might raise in unionized workplaces and 
demands that unions rarely raise.228 Professor Hyde recognized that such 
self-initiated organizations are already protected by the NLRA, but he 
suggested that both broader interpretations of the requirements for section 7 
protected conduct229 and recognizing an employee-choice defense to section 
8(a)(2)230 unfair labor practice charges that an employer has dominated or 
226. See supra part V.A.2. 
227. See Hyde, supra note 76. 
228. !d. at 157. 
229. !d. at 165-7 1 .  
230. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . .  (2) to dominate or interfere with the 
formation of administration of any labor organization or contribute fmancial or other support to it. . .  " 29 
U.S.C. § 1 58(a)(2). The Board's interpretation of § 8(a)(2) as prohibiting teams and committees 
composed of representatives of management and employees has been very controversial and has been 
the subject of reform proposals. The Board's interpretation was most famously articulated in 
Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1 992), enforced, 35 F.2d 1 1 48 (7th Cir. 1994). Congress passed 
a bill that would have modified the Board's reading of § 8(a)(2) in 1996, the Teamwork for Employees 
and Managers Act (S. 295, H.R. 743), but President Clinton vetoed the bill. See Clinton Vetoes TEAM 
Act Despite Pleas From Business for Passsage, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 147 (July 3 1 ,  1996). There 
is a wealth of academic commentary on § 8(a)(2) and reform proposals. See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy, 
Employee Partic ipation in the New Millennium: Redefining a Labor Organization Under Section 
8(A)(2) of the NLRA, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 651 ( 1999); Michael C. Harper, The Continuing Relevance of 
Section 8(A) (2) to the Contempormy Workplace, 96 MICH. L. REv. 2322 (1998); Rafael Gely, Whose 
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unlawfully assisted a labor organization could facilitate and encourage these 
caucuses .23 1 His proposal is fully consistent with the new vision of the 
NLRA for nonunion workers advocated in this article. 
Regarding the first change, this article has addressed some of the 
recommendations that have been made for broadening the concertedness, 
mutual aid or protection, and egregious conduct requirements for protection 
under section 7.232 As to the second change that Hyde advocates, a recent 
decision of the NLRB provides some new hope for those who have argued 
that the Board's Electromation, Inc.233 decision made it too risky for 
employers to work with nonunion employee committees and groups. In 
Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc.,234 the Board held that production teams and 
employee participation teams composed of employees and managers did not 
constitute "labor organizations"; consequently, the employer did not violate 
Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA by maintaining these committees.235 
Caucuses aside, Professor Summers, Professor Hyde and others have 
demonstrated the potential roles that nonmajority unions can play in 
informing employees of their rights, representing them, and bargaining for 
them.236 Unions can respond to the challenge of aggressively pursuing 
nonmajority representation by informing nonunion employees of their 
section 7 rights and assisting them in asserting and vindicating those rights. 
It is premature to predict whether a reinvigorated NLRA for nonunion 
employees would be a catalyst for voluntary, informal caucuses or 
Team Are You On? My Team or My Team?: The NLRA 's Section 8(A)(2) and the TEAM Act, 49 
RUTGERS L. REV. 323 ( 1 997); Abigail Evans, Note: Cooperation or Co-Optation: When Does a Union 
Become Employer-Dominated Under Section 8(A)(2) of the Nation Labor Relations Act?, 100 COLUM. 
L. REv. 1022 (2000). 
23 1 .  Hyde, supra note 76, at 1 7 1 -90. 
232. See supra notes 100-154 and accompanying text. 
233. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1 992), enforced, 35 F.2d 1 148 (7th Cir. 1 994). 
234. 334 N.L.R.B. No. 92 (July 20, 2001). 
235. This decision has been praised as a significant inroad in interpreting section 8(a)(2) to permit 
employers to establish employee committees. See House Committee Issues Statement on NLRB Ruling, 
LAB. L. REP., LAB. REL. (CCH) No. 771, at 5-6 (Aug. 8, 2001). Many people in labor law had called for 
such a liberalization of the Board's law to permit committee structures that may serve employer and 
employee needs. Though the legality of employee committees is beyond the scope of this paper, the 
decision in Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. may mean that one potential legal constraint on concerted 
activity in the absence of unions has been eased. 
236. Summers, Unions Without Majority, supra note 217;  Alan Hyde, Frank Sheed & Mary Deery 
Uva, After Smyrna: Rights and Powers of Unions That Represent Less Than a Majority, 45 RUTGERS L. 
REv. 637 (1 993). As Professor Summers explains, there has been an inordinate focus on § 9(a) of the 
NLRA, which provides for exclusive representative capacity of a union selected by a majority of a 
bargaining unit. See Summers, Unions Without Majority, supra note 21 7, at 53 1 .  That focus has 
detracted from the fact that a union without majority support, in the absence of an exclusive bargaining 
representative, can present employee demands and request negotiations, call a protected strike, and make 
a collective bargaining agreement for its members; moreover, employees can insist that their employer 
conduct negotiations over terms and conditions of employment with their nonmajority union 
representative. !d. at 536-40. 
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nonmajority union representation. Clearly, however, employees would be 
well advised to seek input and participation from their co-workers to assure 
that they satisfy the concertedness requirement237 and and to consider 
whether they have sufficient power to obtain what they want. It seems safe 
to predict, however, that some employees exercising section 7 rights 
without any formal organization or representative would learn the value of 
organizations and representation. 
B. The Revival of Group Rights and Worker Self Help 
The shift from group rights and industrial pluralism to an individual 
rights regime has revealed numerous problems with the new paradigm as 
the dominant form of regulation of the workplace.238 These problems will 
become more pronounced if Congress and state legislatures continue to 
pursue the individual rights regime as the dominant approach for the future. 
Moreover, it is possible that there will not be sufficient political will or 
clout to enact needed worker protections under the individual rights 
paradigm. 
A rejuvenation and recommitment to concerted and constructive 
concerted action in nonunion workplaces would diminish the need to rely 
on a host of new individual employment rights statutes. This could be good 
for the nation, and employers should come to see it as preferable to a 
proliferation of individual rights statutes.239 But is it better for workers? In 
many ways, it is. First, section 7 gives employees the freedom to identify 
what they think they need and to express their views and fight for it, rather 
than receiving what the legislature thinks they need through an individual 
rights statute. 
Second, section 7 develops in employees a sense of power and self­
reliance. It empowers them both to identify what they want and to help 
themselves in obtaining it. The individual rights regime is sometimes fairly 
criticized for creating a sense of entitlement to terms and conditions that the 
workers neither identified nor fought to obtain. The goal of reinvigorating 
the NLRA for the nonunion workplace should be to give employees 
flexibility, self-determination, and self-reliance regarding their struggles to 
obtain terms and conditions of employment. 
Third, the NLRB procedures provide an alternative to the litigation 
of individual rights in the courts or the arbitration of such claims outside the 
23 7. Summers, Unions Without Majority, supra note 2 1 7, at 542 ("The individual, by making the 
report or protest through the union, relying on established union policy, or obtaining endorsement by the 
union, converts his or her individual action into 'concerted activity' and obtains the protection of section 
7. Where a non-majority union exists, no employee need be vulnerable under Meyers Industries, Inc."). 
238. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text. 
239. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44. 
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context of collective bargaining. Employees who think their section 7 
rights have been violated do not have to find an attorney who is willing to 
take their case. They can file a charge with a regional office of the NLRB. 
If, after an investigation, the General Counsel files a complaint, then the 
General Counsel brings the case, and it is heard by an administrative law 
judge. The downside for employees is that the remedies under the NLRA 
are not as great as the remedies available under individual rights statutes 
and common law theories. There have been numerous proposals for 
augmenting the remedies under the NLRA, and such proposals continue to 
merit consideration. 
Fourth, a renewed emphasis on a group rights regime of labor law 
could reverse the "bowling alone" syndrome in the workplace. In his 
much-discussed book, Professor Robert Putnam argues that American 
community and the store of social capital (the collective value of all social 
networks) have been eroding over the past quarter century.240 Professor 
Cynthia Estlund considers this problem a serious one, but much more than 
Putnam, she views the workplace as a venue where the problem manifests 
itself and as a place offering great potential for reconstruction of 
community and social capital.241 In fact, she views the workplace as second 
only to the family in importance for associational life and cooperative 
interaction.242 It is arguable that the workplace has superseded the family in 
that realm. This makes the workplace an important front on which to 
restore social capital. 
Professor Estlund argues that to reconstruct social capital in the 
workplace, labor law reforms should focus on "encouraging more 
cooperative and participatory modes of workplace organization and at 
realizing the law's often illusory protection of freedom of association and 
discussion among co-workers ."243 She recognizes the importance of the 
NLRA to this vision, although she stresses the dominant role of Title VII. 244 
For those concerned with the deterioration in community and social capital, 
the workplace is the place to begin reconstruction. The NLRA is predicated 
on organization and collective action. If employees learn that they can band 
together, make their desires known to their employer and act together to 
exert pressure in support of their demands with the protection of the law, 
they will relearn the value of community. 
240. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY (2000). 
241 .  Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, C ivil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 1 (2000). 
242. /d. at 3 .  
243. /d. at 6. 
244. /d. at 74-77. 
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VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The NLRA and the industrial plunilism principle of group rights and 
struggle for employment terms and conditions are the labor law of the past. 
The individual employment rights laws, with their provision of specified 
minimum rights and individual enforcement, have been the predominant 
type of employment law for at least forty years. . But, as we enter the 
twenty-first century, what will be the approach to legal regulation of the 
workplace? This article has not argued for displacing the individual rights 
regime; rather, it has argued that this regime has problems and limitations. 
Moreover, the article has contended that because the NLRA, with its group 
rights approach, is applicable to nonunion employees, it holds out great 
promise for supplementing the individual rights regime and decreasing 
reliance on such laws. Some changes are needed in the law, but what is 
most needed is a new vision of labor and employment law-a blending of 
the law of the past and the law of the present-to address the workplace 
problems of the future. The National Labor Relations Board already has 
signaled the potential of the NLRA for protecting and empowering 
nonunion employees in its recent decision in Epilepsy Foundation, Inc. 
We need a new vision of labor and employment law that includes the 
National Labor Relations Act as a principal component so that workers can 
learn the power of association, so that we can protect workers in ways that 
they want to be protected, and so that our society can learn in the workplace 
the value of community. In 1 989, Professor Morris described this type of 
revival of the NLRA as "Senator Wagner's grand vision."245 It is a vision 
that we need in the twenty-first century. 
245. Morris, supra note 2, at 1754. 
